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TUNING UP GIDEON'S TRUMPET
Kim Taylor- Thompson
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks left more than human
casualties in their wake. The U.S. system of justice suffered
unexpected and devastating blows at the insistence of a Justice
Department intent on crushing a new threat. The Bush
Administration's declaration of a war against terror became the
rallying cry-and ready excuse-for unusual measures that struck at
the heart of constitutional guarantees.' Justice Department officials
sought an unprecedented expansion of police powers ostensibly to aid
their efforts. They quickly moved to hold an American citizen
incommunicado indefinitely without charges, branded him an "enemy
combatant,"3 and thereby denied him access to counsel.
One reason that the Justice Department could so easily thwart
constitutional guarantees is that it accurately predicted the dearth of
public outcry. The nation simply sat mute. The evangelistic strain of
patriotism that had pervaded both the nation and public dialogue
stifled critics of the Department's policies who feared being
denounced as unpatriotic.' But the scant protests may have
uncovered an even more disturbing truth: the American public fails to
grasp the seriousness of any denial of the right to counsel because that
right has been so poorly developed and articulated. In that truth lies a
warning-a warning that predates September 11, 2001. The seeds of
the public's lack of clarity about the meaning of the right to counsel
took hold in 1963 when the United States Supreme Court issued its
landmark decision in Gideon v. Wainwright.5 The Court seized the
chance to establish the right to counsel for defendants charged with
felonies, but then squandered the opportunity to explain the precise
1. See, e.g., George Packer, Left Behind, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 2002, § 6
(Magazine), at 42 (discussing prosecution of defense lawyer Lynne Stewart based on
tape recordings of her cellblock conversations with her client).
2. See, e.g., Michael Isikoff, And Justice For All, Newsweek, Aug. 19, 2002, at 32
(discussing case of Jose Padilla, the alleged "dirty bomber").
3. See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (discussing the sources and nature of
the authority to create military commissions for the trial of enemy combatants); Eric
Lichtblau, Senators Press Ashcroft to Justify Tactics in Terror War, L.A. Times, July
26, 2002, at A20 (questioning whether the Justice Department uses guidelines to
determine who will be treated as an enemy combatant).
4. See, e.g., Gail Russell Chaddock, Soft Debate Surfaces on Terror War,
Christian Sci. Monitor, Mar. 4, 2002, at 1 (discussing reluctance among Democratic
lawmakers to raise doubts about government tactics in the War on Terror).
5. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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features that made assistance so pivotal. That is not to suggest that
Gideon v. Wainwright and its progeny6 did not spawn key changes in
the criminal justice system. These decisions championed the right to
counsel as a bedrock principle and simultaneously informed the states
that lawyers were no longer a luxury in criminal cases. The Court
reasoned that just as the government always relied on representation
by counsel in safeguarding the interests of the state, the accused had
at least an equally compelling right to counsel's assistance in
vindicating her interests against the power of the state's accusation.
Therefore, generations have rightly celebrated Gideon for its
contributions.7
But Gideon has also drawn criticism for what it did not do.' The
decision left open the critical question of how states might develop a
coherent system of representation for indigent individuals charged
with crimes.9 The opinion ignored questions of cost even as it
imposed a burden on the states."' Even more troubling, the decision
failed to define effective representation. The Court simply elected not
to explore in any depth those attributes of representation that the
accused is constitutionally guaranteed in a criminal prosecution. That
omission has contributed to the all too common practice of
jurisdictions tolerating and even fostering minimal levels of
performance by counsel appointed to represent indigent clients in
criminal cases.
6. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (extending right to counsel
to misdemeanor cases); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964) (extending
right to counsel to uncharged suspect); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58
(1963) (extending right to counsel to direct appeals).
7. See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, Gideon's Trumpet (1964); Yale Kamisar, The
Gideon Case 25 Years Later, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1988, at A27 (describing the
Gideon decision as "one of the most popular decisions ever handed down by the
United States Supreme Court").
8. In a symposium commemorating the thirty-sixth anniversary of the Gideon
decision, one of the authors of the petitioner's brief, Abe Krash, in retrospect
conceded that the legal team representing Gideon on appeal did not fully appreciate
or emphasize a number of issues that give meaning to the right to counsel. He noted
that the right to counsel must include competent representation, sufficient funding to
mount an effective defense, and that counsel must be present at every stage of the
proceedings. See Gideon - A Generation Later, 58 Md. L. Rev. 1333, 1352 (1999)
(remarks of Abe Krash).
9. See Kim Taylor-Thompson, Individual Actor v. Institutional Player.
Alternating Visions of the Public Defender, 84 Geo. L.J. 2419 (1996) [hereinafter
Taylor-Thompson, Alternating Visions].
10. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence not for the
Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 Yale L.J. 1835, 1870 (1994) (noting that
the dream of Gideon has not been realized largely because of the lack of funding to
"employ lawyers at wages and benefits equal to what is spent on the prosecution");
Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the
Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 Hastings Const. L.Q. 625
(1986) (detailing how the severity of underfunding undermines the Sixth Amendment
guarantee to effective assistance) [hereinafter Klein, The Emperor Gideon].
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In the years following Gideon, the Court stitched together a vision
of the defense lawyer as adversary to the state in a series of disparate
cases in which the Court addressed and identified the rights of an
individual accused.1 Still, the absence in the Gideon opinion itself of
even the broad outlines of what might serve as a benchmark of
representation seems at best short-sighted. What we know with the
benefit of hindsight is that the Court missed an important moment to
use the Gideon decision as a vehicle to shape expectations of what
effective representation entails. What we don't know is how the
terrain might have shifted had the Court not left states to enunciate
these principles in a vacuum. Cautious speculation suggests that had
the Court articulated a more textured vision in Gideon, today's fight
to realize and preserve a right to effective assistance of counsel would
not present such an uphill battle.
Tempting as it might be to foist full responsibility for this critical
omission on the Court, others share the blame for failing to give
genuine meaning to the concept of effective representation. In
particular, defense lawyers have been at fault. They have been slow
to seize on the importance of explicitly defining and promoting a
conception of their practice. While quality representation of the
indigent accused has been eagerly championed, particularly by public
defenders, defining "quality" has been elusive. Defenders aspire to
provide quality in their representation-even publicly claim to
provide it-yet they have rarely developed a clear sense of either its
constituent parts or how one might measure it. As a start, some public
defenders have consciously chosen to assert control over how their
offices operate.12 In so doing, they have defined their offices as
alternatives to large unwieldy delivery machines that churn out
representation on an assembly line.13 These offices have either
modeled themselves after law firms offering "full service" to indigent
clients 4 or have chosen to adopt a community orientation linking
11. The Supreme Court signaled its expectation that defense lawyers would
uncover and raise constitutional claims. See, e.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759, 768 (1970) (noting that for a defendant "who considers his confession involuntary
and hence unusable against him at a trial,. . . [t]he sensible course would be to contest
his guilt, prevail on his confession claim at trial, on appeal, or, if necessary, in a
collateral proceeding, and win acquittal, however guilty he might be"); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (requiring warnings prior to custodial
interrogation); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963) (barring the use
of the "fruit" of the government's illegal actions); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961) (extending the exclusionary rule to the states).
12. See generally Taylor-Thompson, Alternating Visions, supra note 9.
13. See generally Richard Klein, The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be
Compelled to Render Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 Ind. L.J. 363 (1993);
Chester L. Mirsky, The Political Economy & Indigent Defense: New York City, 1917-
1998, 1997 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 891.
14. See, e.g., Emily Barker, Can He Build a Cravath for the Poor?, Am. Law., Apr.
1995, at 46 (describing The Legal Aid Society of New York's efforts to create a full-
service organization modeled after a private law firm).
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individual client needs to those of a broader, similarly subordinated
population. But even in these instances, defenders have not
sufficiently articulated the protocols of quality defense internally or
made the case for the value of their work externally. The defense bar
lacks a consistent voice both to give meaning to the right to counsel
and to set a high standard for representation. This lack of leadership
has led to a troubling void.
In response to this vacuum left by defenders, others predictably
have stepped into the breach. The legal profession as a whole
attempted to sketch the features of representation through the use of
ethical guidelines and the development of professional performance
standards. 6 This process generated obvious benefits. Professional
codes of conduct permitted the profession at once to exercise some
control over the role of counsel and to guarantee some degree of
uniformity of conduct at least within a given jurisdiction. But state
codes operate principally as regulatory schemes that do little more
than catalogue general aspirational goals for the profession and serve
as a means of identifying and removing the worst offenders once
something has gone awry. A wide variety of practices occupy the
space between these extremes, leaving lawyers, clients and the public
with the mistaken impression that the role of counsel is wildly variable
and fluid.
Sadly, the Supreme Court has often fostered this view. While the
Warren Court appeared firmly committed to a path that would
provide a roadmap to effective representation, the Burger Court
ultimately veered off course by narrowly interpreting the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. In Strickland v. Washington," the Court
designated the minimal level of representation required in a criminal
proceeding, any representation below which would constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel. The two-pronged analysis that the
Court adopted considers (1) whether the lawyer's performance fell
below acceptable levels and (2) whether that performance prejudiced
the accused. In essence, the Court set the low bar-or, perhaps more
accurately, no bar-for effective assistance."
15. The Neighborhood Defender Service of Harlem, a community-based defender
office established in 1990, emphasizes that its location in the community, use of team
representation and focus on long-term needs of clients are the factors that distinguish
it from other defender offices. See, e.g., Neighborhood Defender Service of Harlem,
at http://www.ndsny.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2003).
16. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct (2002); Model Code of Prof'l
Responsibility (1992); A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice (1993).
17. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
18. In an uncharacteristic application of Strickland, the Court granted relief in
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 398-99 (2000) (noting that federal habeas corpus
relief was warranted under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) because the state court
unreasonably applied Strickland in finding counsel's lack of preparation for capital
sentencing hearing did not "prejudice" accused). The Court thereafter reverted to its
old ways this past term in Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 1852-54 (2002)
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In formulating this test, the Court may have been less interested in
establishing a standard for performance and more concerned with the
lack of finality in a system that might permit too much second
guessing of lawyers' performances. 9 But the ruling has proved
disabling to the right to effective assistance of counsel in practice. The
post hoc analysis, which encourages the court to defer considerably to
counsel's judgment about tactics, has led to the corrosive conclusion
that sleeping2° or drunk lawyers21 can pass constitutional muster.
2 2
Thus, the Court has effectively removed any real qualitative baseline.
Elected officials, on the other hand, have been quick to define the
representational threshold in quantitative terms. The conventional
political maneuver has been for government funding authorities to
distill the duty to provide assistance to the indigent accused into an
obligation to conduct volume business at rock-bottom prices. With
their eyes fixed on ever shrinking funds available to finance the
growing obligations of government, these funders carefully and
consistently evade the question of quality. Instead, as a matter of
routine, they demand that indigent defense service providers set and
then meet specific requirements to justify their budget allotments,
measuring performance according to the defenders' ability to handle
at discounted prices a set number of cases during a fiscal year. Politics
and current economic conditions may push defenders to secure a
finding of reasonable doubt at a reasonable price, but holding
defenders accountable for their budgetary expenditures does not
sufficiently consider the loss in quality that such efficiency exacts.
Quite obviously, too limited a focus on efficiency can be at odds with
efforts to provide quality in representation.
Quality representation demands a more robust definition than that
provided in any of the above mentioned contexts. Nearly forty years
(noting that state court did not unreasonably apply Strickland in finding that counsel's
performance fell within "the wide range of reasonable professional assistance"
notwithstanding counsel's failure to call witnesses and waiver of closing argument in
capital sentencing stage of trial).
19. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90.
20. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Casualties of the War on Crime: Fairness,
Reliability and the Credibility of Criminal Justice Systems, 51 U. Miami L. Rev. 413,
419-20 (1997). The case widely known for the "sleeping lawyer" eventually resulted
in a finding of ineffectiveness and a grant of habeas corpus relief. See Burdine v.
Johnson, 262 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Cockrell v.
Burdine, 122 S. Ct. 2347 (2002). Thus, in the most extreme cases, reversal of a
conviction may ultimately be possible even under Strickland's restrictive standard.
21. See, e.g., People v. Garrison, 765 P.2d 419, 440 (Cal. 1989) (finding that a
lawyer was not ineffective even though he consumed large amounts of alcohol each
day of the trial and was arrested for drunk driving on his way to the courthouse).
22. See Kenneth B. Nunn, The Trial as Text. Allegory, Myth and Symbol in the
Adversarial Criminal Process-A Critique of the Role of the Public Defender and a
Proposal for Reform, 32 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 743 (1995) (observing that since




ago, Herbert Packer observed, "[t]he kind of criminal process we have
depends importantly on certain value choices that are reflected,
explicitly or implicitly, in its habitual functioning."23 Using this
measurement to assess the current state of the American criminal
justice system, one comes to an inescapable conclusion: our system of
justice routinely manifests tremendous disdain for effective indigent
criminal defense. Like many other issues, questions about whether
the right to counsel will continue to operate as a cornerstone of the
American justice system have crystallized in the period following the
September 11 events. To withstand the political attacks in all their
variety, defense lawyers need to articulate and convey not only what
constitutes quality in the delivery of defense services, but also why
that brings value to our system of justice. Public defenders may be
uniquely situated to craft this definition given that they will likely
experience repercussions from the current fashionable political stance:
a stance that pretends that the nation can and must suspend certain
fundamental rights as it maneuvers through the current terrorist crisis.
To do this, defenders may need to draw inspiration from other
professions to glean lessons about the mechanics of identifying and
promoting quality in the delivery of their services. These other
disciplines may well offer helpful models as defenders tackle the
challenge of defining the essence of that which they provide. But
more to the point, defenders will need to survey other defenders in
the field, paying particular attention to those individuals and offices
most often identified by lawyers and clients as delivering the most
comprehensive and innovative service. Quality is obviously a
multidimensional construct. But an examination of the component
parts of these approaches to lawyering may begin to form the
framework for identifying the key attributes in a system that is
relentlessly committed to quality representation for individuals
charged with crimes.
Any meaningful effort to define quality in representation will likely
generate debate about the wisdom of pinning down a specific set of
expectations for defense counsel to fulfill. Defenders, like other
professionals, will most likely wish to avoid being subject to any
additional scrutiny. To address this concern, any real discussion of
whether defenders should engage in a process of defining their role
should also address the optimal level of specificity necessary to
identify and promote quality in representation. The defense
community and clients should pose hard questions about the
appropriate measures of quality once it has been defined. Critical
thought and honest and open dialogue should surround the means of
enforcing the norms of representation. However, if the environment
23. Herbert Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 5
(1964).
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following the September 11 events offers an accurate rather than
atypical gauge, these questions will not garner the attention they
deserve unless the defense community insists on addressing them
publicly. More troubling still, the absence of robust discussion could
hasten the erosion of the right to counsel. While resolving such
questions will not likely produce cozy consensus or easy answers, the
debate itself can issue a powerful public message that the guarantee of
effective representation forms a core principle in our system of justice.
The aim of this article is to begin the debate. Part I revisits the
history of the right to counsel and suggests that the Court's internal
struggle over federalism locked the Gideon decision into a framework,
one in which the Court could only define the components of the right
to counsel in the broadest terms. The unappreciated cost of the
Court's lack of specificity has been a legacy of ineffective assistance
that has now shifted the onus of defining the components of the right
to counsel to the indigent defense community. Part II briefly
examines the effort by the health care profession to wrest its
objectives away from outside parties and to establish for itself what
constitutes quality in health care. This section concludes by
speculating about ways that the indigent defense community might
similarly undertake the task of defining and embracing quality.
I. GIDEON: THE MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO STRIKE A CHORD FOR
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
Most talk about the right to counsel properly acknowledges the
pivotal role that Gideon v. Wainwright plays in extending that right to
the states. Until the Court held in 1963 that states must provide
counsel to an accused in serious cases, the picture had been bleak,
particularly in the South. 4 Indigent defendants could anticipate the
daunting prospect of-and predictable fate that flowed from-
defending themselves against skilled lawyers representing the interests
of the state. With the stroke of a pen, the Court converted this
landscape by mandating the appointment of counsel to advocate for
the individual accused of a crime in state courts. In that instant, the
Supreme Court reshaped the system of justice in state criminal trials.
Or so it seemed. For all its significance, the Gideon decision has
fallen short of the goal the Court seemed intent on achieving. This
problem emerges from twin sources in the clarity of hindsight. First,
24. At the time that the Court decided Gideon, five southern states did not assure
the appointment of counsel for the poor except in capital cases. Eight states
appointed counsel without the benefit of either statute or court rule in urban areas,
but appointment in rural areas often did not take place. Thirty-seven states formally
required the provision of counsel in serious cases. See Lewis, supra note 7, at 132;
Yale Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on
"The Most Pervasive Right" of An Accused, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1962).
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the decision set out to overrule Betts v. Brady25 and necessarily turned
its attention backward to justify its departure from precedent. The
Gideon opinion today reads more like a retrospective justification for
deviating from precedent than a prospective elaboration of the right
to counsel, and understandably so. The Warren Court had its work
cut out for it given the legal context in which the Court announced the
Gideon decision. The Court had previously made clear that it
appreciated the fundamental necessity of counsel in a criminal case.
The injustices that flowed from the absence of counsel appeared
thoroughly incompatible with constitutional protections. But while
the right to counsel applied without limitation in federal courts,26 the
Court had divided on how far it could extend that right to the states.
Some explanation of the circuitous path to this decision, therefore,
seemed appropriate. This concentration on Betts, however, may have
pigeonholed the Court's thinking, leading it to place more emphasis
on the need to appoint counsel rather than on the symbiotic
relationship between counsel and a fair trial.
Second, the price that unanimity in the decision appears to have
exacted was that the opinion speaks only in general, uncontroversial
terms about the right to counsel. Earlier in Betts, the option of
applying the right to counsel in state courts had plunged the Justices
further into the turbulent debate over federalism and whether the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated and applied the entire Bill of
Rights to the states.27 Perhaps seeking to avoid the deeper currents
that divided the Court in Betts, the Gideon opinion skimmed the
surface, electing to extend the right to counsel to the states without
much elaboration. Given the significance of the ruling applying this
fundamental principle to all states, one might have expected the Court
to engage in the sort of painstaking analysis that it expected of courts,
counsel, and legislatures as they gave substance to the right to counsel.
Instead, the Court provided little more than nominal guidance to the
states. 28 The opinion used broad strokes when fine lines might have
added precision to the ruling's message. In the end, mapping the
constitutional coordinates to a state mandate for counsel was anything
but direct or simple.
A. Gideon's Chosen Path: Establishing the Right to Counsel
The journey to Gideon begins with Powell v. Alabama.29 The
decision reversed the convictions of eight young African American
men who had received death sentences for the rape of two white
women in Scottsboro, Alabama. In every respect, the trial remains
25. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
26. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
27. See Betts, 316 U.S. at 462, 465, 474-75.
28. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,344 (1963).
29. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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the paradigmatic case of a rush to judgment. Within days of the near
lynching of the accused men by an angry mob of citizens in
Scottsboro, they were brought to trial and convicted. At the time of
arraignment, the trial court judge, unwilling to saddle any individual
member of the bar with the unpopular task of defending the young
men, appointed the entire bar. Needless to say, no one felt singularly
responsible for the investigation or preparation of the case. Indeed,
on the morning of trial, only one local lawyer stepped forward
indicating a willingness to defend the men, and another lawyer,
unfamiliar with Alabama law, agreed to assist. In each of three trials
completed in one day, an all white jury convicted the men and
returned death sentences.
The combustible combination of race and violence created a sense
of urgency in reversing these sentences. In the midst of the notoriety
attending the facts of this case, the Court enunciated the principle that
the rigors of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment required
more than that which occurred in this case. The assistance that
counsel provided here-having been appointed the day of trial-was
the functional equivalent of no assistance at all. The Court stressed
that the defendants lacked the aid of counsel "in any real sense,"
because the trial court had denied them assistance during the "most
critical period of the proceedings.., that is to say, from the time of
their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when consultation,
thoroughgoing investigation and preparation were vitally
important."30 Appointing all members of the bar could not satisfy the
due process requirements when, as in this case, counsel could not
"investigate the facts, advise and direct the defense, or participate in
those necessary conferences between counsel and accused which
sometimes partake of the inviolable character of the confessional."31
The facts made abundantly clear that the trial court had failed to
furnish that which the right to counsel envisioned: effective aid as a
prerequisite to a fair trial. Thus, cases that presented similar
circumstances to those in Powell required the appointment of counsel.
At that moment, Powell's focus seemed to signal the Court's intention
to unite the right to counsel with the content of that which counsel
should provide: "effective and substantial aid."3
But the moment would pass. The extreme facts of Powell that
compelled the Court to take action, in turn, permitted lower courts to
treat the case as unique. The Powell decision began to lay the
groundwork for applying the right to counsel to the states, yet the
newly announced standard seemed tied to capital cases. The Court
noted,
30. Id. at 57.
31. Id. at 61.
32. Id. at 53.
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All that it is necessary now to decide, as we do decide, is that in a
capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is
incapable adequately of making his own defense because of
ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of
the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a
necessary requisite of due process of law; and that duty is not
discharged by an assignment at such a time or under such
circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the
preparation and trial of the case.33
In carving out the right in capital cases, the Powell decision
captured and advanced the critical connection between representation
by counsel and a fair trial. However, the question of the application
of the right to counsel in non-capital state cases remained open and
unanswered for the next ten years.
In the interim, the Court took steps to give the right to counsel
meaning in federal courts. The Sixth Amendment made plain that
courts could not preclude an accused from securing counsel in her
defense.34 Indeed, until Johnson v. Zerbst35 that is precisely how
courts interpreted the right. What had resulted from this reading of
the Sixth Amendment's protection was a caste system based on wealth
that undermined the safeguards of the right to counsel. Only the
wealthy accused could exercise the Sixth Amendment guarantee
because only she could afford to hire counsel. In response to this
iniquity in 1938, the Court began at once to level the playing field and
to elaborate on the Sixth Amendment's reach. Johnson v. Zerbst
extended the right to counsel to indigent defendants by informing
courts that the Sixth Amendment operated as a jurisdictional bar to
both a valid conviction and sentence if the court failed to "complete
the court-as the Sixth Amendment requires-by providing counsel
for an accused who is unable to obtain counsel, who has not
intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or
liberty is at stake. 36
In coming to grips with the complexities involved in the criminal
process, the Court was staking out the substantive terrain for the right
to counsel. The Court explained that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel expanded the court's obligation beyond protecting the "feeble
33. Id. at 71.
34. See David Cole, No Equal Justice 65 (1999); Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Warren
Court and American Politics 380 (2000); Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The
Meaning of "Counsel" in the Sixth Amendment, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 433, 438-59 (1993)
(discussing the history of the Sixth Amendment); Bruce J. Winick, Forfeiture of
Attorneys' Fees under RICO and CCE and the Right to Counsel of Choice: The
Constitutional Dilemma and How to Avoid It, 43 U. Miami L. Rev. 765,786-89 (1989).
35. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
36. Id. at 468.
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minded" defendant, as Powell had articulated the duty, to include the
average individual accused of a crime. The right to counsel
embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the
average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to
protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take
his life or liberty.... That which is simple, orderly and necessary to
the lawyer, to the untrained layman may appear intricate, complex
and mysterious. 38
Thus, the Court seemed to imbue the right to counsel with crucial
components-training and professional skill that would operate to
protect the accused against the deprivation of her life or liberty. Not
only did Johnson v. Zerbst continue to clarify and elaborate on the
meaning of the right to counsel, but it also seemed a logical step
forward from Powell. If the Sixth Amendment guarantee
contemplated the assistance of counsel as an essential component of
fairness in a trial, then all defendants in federal court were entitled to
that protection.
The Court's first misstep occurred when it considered the
application of this right to state proceedings. Although the
Constitution required the appointment of counsel in federal courts to
"insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty,"39 the Court in
Betts v. Brady411 concluded that the Sixth Amendment did not express
a rule "so fundamental and essential to a fair trial, and so, to due
process of law" that it must apply if the prosecution occurred in a state
court.4" The Court rejected a rigid application of the right to counsel,
arguing instead that the Fourteenth Amendment contemplated a
more fluid application of the Sixth Amendment guarantee in state
proceedings. The sticking point was the question of whether the
United States Constitution should restrict the authority of the states
to decide whether particular prosecutions warranted the appointment
of counsel. The Court acknowledged that there might be a particular
set of contingencies under which the Sixth Amendment guarantee
would compel the appointment of counsel-when the court
determined that to proceed without counsel would be "shocking to
the universal sense of justice. '42 But within those patently inexplicit
parameters, states could freely determine on a case by case basis when
they should appoint or deny counsel.
Betts, thus, deviated from the Court's previous path, which Justice
Black's dissent denounced as ill-conceived. 43 Although Justice Black's
37. id. at 462-63 (referring to Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 462.
40. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
41. Id. at 465.
42. Id. at 462.
43. See id. at 475-76 (Black, J., dissenting).
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views firmly embraced the position that the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporated all of the safeguards of the Bill of Rights, he conceded
that the majority of the Justices did not share his perspective. He
insisted, however, that, given the Court's precedents, the Betts holding
withdrew from the accused the very protections that the Court had
previously deemed critical. In his effort to work past the Court's
internal dysfunction, he tried to make clear the magnitude of this
ruling's error as he reiterated the dangers the Court's prior decisions
had noted when lower courts denied counsel to an accused. He then
reminded the majority of the inexorable link between counsel and the
fairness of a criminal proceeding. Quoting Powell, he echoed the view
that, without the guiding hand of counsel, the innocent accused would
not know how to establish innocence.44 But Justice Black's views were
to remain relegated to the dissent until Gideon. Over his objections,
the Court approved a double standard between federal and state
prosecutions.
The resulting dual approach to the right to counsel may have said
more about the Court's own struggle over federalism and
incorporation of the Bill of Rights than it did about the Court's
definition of the right to counsel. In practice, Betts v. Brady soon
became an anachronism. Those states that were loathe to recognize a
right to appointment of counsel, not surprisingly, found that their
cases did not present the sort of special circumstances45 that required
appointment of counsel.46 But in every case that came before the
Supreme Court from 1950 to 1962, the Court managed to find a
violation of due process when states had refused to appoint counsel in
criminal trials.47 The problem was that not every case involving a
denial of counsel reached the Supreme Court. In the end, the Court's
right to counsel jurisprudence seemed schizophrenic at best.
As Betts came increasingly under fire,4" the Court seemed poised to
reconsider it. Chief Justice Earl Warren made clear that he believed
44. Id. at 476 (Black, J., dissenting).
45. See Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134, 135 (1951) (elaborating on the Betts rule
suggesting that state courts can deny counsel unless there are "special circumstances
showing that without a lawyer a defendant could not have an adequate and a fair
defense").
46. See generally Ralph Ruebner et al., Shaking the Foundation of Gideon: A
Critique of Nichols in Overruling Baldasar v. Illinois, 25 Hofstra L. Rev. 507, 514 n.33
(1996).
47. See Leo Katcher, Earl Warren: A Political Biography 443 (1967).
48. Justice Douglas cited to a Letter to the Editor by Erwin N. Griswold and
Benjamin Cohen printed in The New York Times on August 2, 1942, at page 6, in his
dissent in Bute v. Illinois. 333 U.S. 640, 677 n.l (1947). In this letter, it is argued that
"at a critical period in world history, Betts v. Brady dangerously tilts the
scales against the safeguarding of one of the most precious rights of man.
For in a free world no man should be condemned to penal servitude for
years without having the right to counsel to defend him. The right of
counsel, for the poor as well as tile rich, is an indispensable safeguard of
freedom and justice under law."
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that an accused in a state prosecution had a right to counsel and his
clerks remained on alert for a vehicle through which the Court might
overrule Betts.49 Initially, Carnley v. Cochran" seemed to present
such an opportunity. The case, which began as a Florida state trial,
raised the question of the fairness of a trial without the assistance of
counsel. Even Justice Frankfurter, a staunch states' rights advocate,
indicated in discussions on the Carnley case that he was inclined to
overrule Betts. He objected, however, to using Carnley for this
purpose because he considered it an "unsavory case."'" The Court,
therefore, considered and reversed Carnley within the confines of the
Betts special circumstances rule, finding both that Mr. Carnley had
been illiterate and that the trial raised issues of legal complexity.
Gideon then emerged as the case in which the Court would revisit
the Betts ruling. In assigning the case to Abe Fortas,52 who would
argue for Mr. Gideon, the Court foreshadowed its primary focus: the
Court specifically asked Fortas to address whether the Court should
overrule Betts. 3 While this issue did not ultimately formulate Fortas's
central argument, it did signal how the Court conceived of the case.
In the end, the opinion would look backward rather than forward in
its effort to unfold the right to counsel in state proceedings. In so
doing, it would negate its own message by failing to prepare states to
understand and fully implement the constitutional safeguards
embodied in the right to counsel.
1. Appreciating the Context of the Opinion
The Court may simply have misread its task in Gideon. Widespread
agreement that an accused should receive the assistance of counsel in
state trials seemed to exist. Forty-five states in one form or another
already appointed counsel in serious cases. 4 Even state prosecutors
appreciated the need for defense counsel in criminal proceedings.
Twenty-two states' attorneys general filed an amicus brief in Gideon
urging the Court to mandate the appointment of counsel in state
felony proceedings." Given this backdrop, the Court may have
perceived that the states did not need it to lay out a detailed
Id.
49. Bernard Schwartz, Super Chief: Earl Warren & His Supreme Court-A
Judicial Biography 458 (1983).
50. 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
51. Carnley involved allegations of intra-family child sexual abuse. Justice
Frankfurter explained that it was impossible to "imagine a worse case, a more
unsavory case to overrule a long standing decision." Powe, supra note 34, at 382.
52. See Lewis, supra note 7, at 48.
53. See id.
54. Brief for Petitioner at 29-30, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (No.
155).




elaboration of what the Court's newly announced right to counsel
envisioned. This evidence suggests that the Court read its principal
objective as explaining its deviation from precedent.
Interestingly, the parties had a more expansive take on their charge.
The briefs did not treat the mistaken approach in Betts as a peripheral
issue, but they did not pretend that it was the sole question worthy of
attention. Instead, the petitioner's brief crafted the argument for
counsel in state criminal cases by locating it firmly within fairness
guarantees.56 Fortas' brief set out to show that the right to counsel did
not apply merely when the accused presented special needs or raised
special concerns. The benefits and protection that counsel provided
applied to the average case-"in every criminal prosecution."57 To
establish this, the brief illustrated why the right to counsel was so
fundamental. Without the assistance of counsel, the accused could
not avail herself of important procedural safeguards.5" Fortas
explained that "[a]n uncounseled defendant manifestly cannot be
expected... to be a master of the intricacies of the law."59 In the
process of explaining the deficiencies in a case handled by an
unrepresented accused, the brief drafted a blueprint of what the right
to counsel ensures.
Fortas was treading on familiar terrain. As an experienced lawyer
himself, he unashamedly explained what the lawyer brings to the
adversary process. He began by clarifying that which Clarence
Gideon was not claiming. Gideon was not asserting extreme youth,
inexperience, mental incapacity or illiteracy as the reasons for his
inability to defend himself.' Nor was he blaming the trial judge.
Although the judge obviously could not serve as Gideon's defense
counsel, he had endeavored to provide what protection he could from
the bench.6 Despite these facts, the brief asserted, Gideon still
suffered harm because he lacked the assistance of counsel. The brief
documented the issues that a lawyer would have recognized and
raised, but that had escaped notice by Gideon's untrained eye.62 In an
appendix, Fortas listed these as the consequences of the failure to
afford Gideon counsel.63  Fortas noted the availability of an
intoxication defense on the question of intent, the court's improper
interference with Gideon's right to confront and cross-examine
56. See Petitioner's Brief at 13, Gideon (No. 155).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 17.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 12. In oral argument, Fortas indicated that Gideon performed well for a
layman. Gideon actively participated in his trial, conducted cross-examinations and
addressed the jury. Fortas contended, however, that no lay person, no matter how
intelligent, can conduct her own defense effectively. See Lewis, supra note 7, at 170.
61. See Petitioner's Brief at 13, Gideon (No. 155).
62. See id. at 13-14.
63. Petitioner's Brief app. B at 49-50, Gideon (No. 155).
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government witnesses, Gideon's lack of awareness of his right to
examine prospective jurors during voir dire and to exercise strikes for
cause, the improper use of hearsay and opinion testimony without
objection, and that the court had not informed Gideon of his right to
make requests regarding final jury instructions or to be informed of
the court's charge before final argument. He also observed that
Gideon made no statement at the time of sentencing.64  By
implication, Fortas suggested that a lawyer would have handled all of
these issues differently and, thereby, would have protected Gideon's
due process rights.
The brief acknowledged the federalism concerns dividing the Court,
but suggested that the course adopted in Betts posed the real threat to
state sovereignty. In an innovative move, Fortas suggested that Betts
had authorized more intrusive supervision of state court actions than a
firm rule would permit. The Betts standard compelled federal courts
to engage in "intensely factual, subjective and post-facto" analyses of
state criminal proceedings." A firm rule would clarify the states'
obligations and curtail the federal court practice of intervening to
review the state courts' appointment decisions. Fortas then conceded
that states should retain the authority to devise methods by which
they would comply with the constitutional guarantee, but he urged the
Court to lay out the governing principle. In defining that principle,
Fortas again advanced a compelling argument that ultimately did not
find its way into the opinion. He explained that the standard being
applied was an entitlement to "effective legal aid [for] all persons
accused of a serious offense who do not competently and intelligently
waive such assistance."66
Even the amicus filed by the twenty-two state attorneys general
recognized and elaborated on the meaning of the right to counsel.67
Perhaps the experience of trying cases in the absence of opposing
counsel-coupled with the prospect that any such convictions could
face reversal on appeal-operated as incentives for these prosecutors
to assert a position in support of Gideon.66 But whatever their
motivations, their brief linked the right to counsel with due process,
arguing that due process is "perhaps, the least frozen concept of our
law-the least confined to history and the most absorptive of powerful
64. Id. at 50.
65. Id. at 12.
66. Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
67. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Attorneys General, Gideon (No. 155).
The amicus brief filed by the American Civil Liberties Union in the case focused
principally on Betts and its impact on defendants in the state system. See generally
Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, Gideon (1963) (No. 155).
68. Counsel for the state of Florida had requested that they file an amicus in
support of the state's position, but the state attorneys could not support Florida's
position. See Lewis, supra note 7, at 151-55.
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social standards of a progressive society. 69
Although the Court had considered the question of the process that
was due in state courts in the Betts case, the amicus urged the Court to
revisit its assessment given that due process evolves through "the
gradual and empiric process of 'inclusion and exclusion. ' ' 7 Where
Betts had gone wrong, they asserted, was in the decision to contract
the right to counsel rather than to expand it to fit the needs of the
criminal justice system in the twentieth century.7 Interestingly,
although the attorneys general had not discussed or exchanged briefs
with Fortas prior to filing,72 the amicus brief raised parallel points
about the qualities that counsel brings to the adversary process. The
amicus argued that the right contemplates that counsel will help the
accused understand how to plead and testify at arraignment, file
motions, examine prospective jurors, testify or remain silent, make
objections, propose instructions, and challenge any invalidity in a
sentence. Perhaps more than any other brief, the amicus filed by the
attorneys general looked prospectively beyond establishing the right
to counsel and considered the practical impact of the ruling. In effect,
the brief accepted as given that the right to counsel extended to the
states.
The attorneys general then delved deeper into the issues that states
would need to address given that premise. Competency of appointed
counsel and the extent to which funding would be available to defense
counsel to make the adversary system operate fairly were the issues
the brief cited as looming problems.73 By advising the Court of the
more pressing issues that states were tackling in complying with the
right to counsel, the amicus offered the Court an opportunity to
provide guidance. As importantly, the brief served as notice that the
Court needed to make clear what it was imposing on the states:
adherence to the Constitution means more than providing a warm
body who happened to be a lawyer.
2. Past as Text, Not Prologue
The Gideon opinion in the end stands as a vindication of Justice
Black's position that the Court had erred in Betts. Justice Black had
dissented in Betts and now, as author of the majority opinion in
Gideon, had the opportunity to align the Court's jurisprudence in this
area with his views. The opinion in Gideon, which Justice Black wrote
and completed quickly,74 essentially tracked the language of his Betts
69. Brief of Amici Curiae Attorneys General at 4, Gideon (No. 155) (quoting
Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20-21 (1956)).
70. Id. at 5.
71. Id.
72. Lewis, supra note 7, at 148.
73. See Brief for Amici Curiae Attorneys General at 21, Gideon (No. 155).
74. Schwartz, supra note 49, at 460 (noting that Justice Black circulated a draft of
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dissent. The opinion extended the right to counsel to the states,
making clear that states had the obligation to appoint counsel when an
indigent accused lacked the wealth to provide her own. But the
opinion deliberately maintained a narrow focus: 75 it did not identify
how far the right extended or what it envisioned accruing to the
accused's benefit.7 6
Given the magnitude of the ruling, the fact that the Court gave such
short shrift to the meaning of the change it imposed remains
surprising. Just two terms earlier, when the Court decided Mapp v.
Ohio,77 the Court seized the moment to lay out in some detail its view
that the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule extended to the
states. In that more elaborate opinion, the Court explained what it
contemplated as a result of this newly applied ruling. The Gideon
decision, however, did not engage in like analysis. The opinion gave
passing comment to key elements of representation, such as
challenging an indictment, undertaking cross-examination, and
understanding the rules of evidence, particularly recognizing the
difference between evidence that is and is not admissible. But the
decision made these references in the context of discussing Powell v.
Alabama.76 Ultimately, the Court acknowledged the importance of
the role of counsel in criminal proceedings, but focused more on the
necessity for appointment than on an explanation of why the accused
and the criminal process needed defense lawyers.
This focus may have reflected the Court's intent to signal to lower
courts that its jurisprudence in this area had merely resumed the
proper track. Justice Black cited cases leading to Gideon to show the
trajectory to this decision and that the Court was now restoring the
line of precedents from which Betts had abruptly broken.79 In so
doing, he may have meant to incorporate by reference the substance
behind the rulings and the right to counsel. However, the fact that
Justice Black did not elaborate on the substance of the right remains,
at best, a curious choice given that the Court was formulating and
announcing a new rule. One might have expected some normative
discussion about that which defense counsel would bring both to the
adversary process and to the accused in state court proceedings.
But perhaps such specificity posed too perilous a path if the Court
hoped to issue a unanimous ruling. The more Justice Black elaborated
on what the right entailed-focusing perhaps on when the right began
and ended and to which offenses it might apply-the more likely some
of the Justices might have taken issue with the decision and split from
the opinion within two weeks of the Justices' vote).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
78. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
79. Id. at 344.
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the majority. Particularly given Justice Black's views of incorporation,
he ran the danger of pushing the Court further than it was prepared to
move at that point. An opinion that generally articulated the
governing principle, therefore, offered less with which the Justices
could quibble."0 For a Court that preferred to issue unanimous rulings
when making broad changes affecting states,"' foregoing a detailed
examination of the specific features of the right may have seemed a
small sacrifice.
The upshot of this choice is that much was lost in the trade. In the
end, the opinion most clearly enunciated the principle that an accused
had the right to appointed counsel if she could not otherwise afford
one and had not waived the right to be so represented. The Court
eloquently observed:
Our state and national constitutions and ,laws have laid great
emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to
assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant
stands equal before the law. This noble idea cannot be realized if
the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a
lawyer to assist him.82
The Court seemed less clear in its commitment to the concept of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel as embodying a guarantee of
quality in representation. In fact, when a differently comprised Court
had the opportunity to consider the substance of the Sixth
Amendment guarantee in state proceedings, the Justices failed to see
a link between the right and quality. 3  The Court made the
provocative and sadly prophetic assertion that "the purpose of the
effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to
improve the quality of legal representation." 4 Thus began the states'
race to the bottom in providing little more than technical compliance
with the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel.
80. Although, interestingly, the brevity of the opinion led Justice Harlan to object
to the way that the majority treated the Betts precedent, complaining that it deserved
a more decent burial. Id. at 349 (Harlan, J., concurring).
81. See, e.g., Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of
Education & Black America's Struggle for Equality 694 (1976) (discussing the Chief
Judge's concern that the Court issue a unanimous ruling in the landmark
desegregation case Brown v. Board of Education); Schwartz, supra note 49, at 94
(noting that while Chief Justice Warren expressed to potential dissenters in Brown v.
Board of Education his sensitivity to the problems that the decision would present the
South, Warren remained "quite firm on the Court's need for unanimity on a matter of
such sensitivity").
82. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
83. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
84. Id.
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B. The Path Not Chosen: Making the Right to Counsel Meaningful
The temptation in looking back at any decision aided by hindsight is
to blame the decision makers for failing to be sufficiently prescient
about events that would unfold. Without imposing the burden of
clairvoyance on the Court, though, there remain particular
observations that the Court could have made in light of precedents,
the information before the Court, and the Court's apparent ambitions.
The Court had more than rough evidence that a gulf could extend
between the normative goal and the empirical reality following a
pronouncement of a new rule with which the states would need to
comply." Appreciating this dynamic, the Court certainly understood
the importance of explicitly laying out that which the ruling
contemplated and demanded.
Precision about the core ingredients of the right to counsel would
have left states with less room to exercise discretion and to deviate
from the principle being announced. By pinning down the
expectations embedded in the right to effective counsel, the Court
could have set a meaningful threshold. To be sure, even precise
statements about the substance of the right to counsel would not alone
have transformed deeply-felt but divergent perceptions of the need
for such a ruling or of the importance of the right. One cannot
realistically expect massive transformations in public thought simply
upon a ruling by the Supreme Court. The fact remains, however, that
clarity about the right to counsel would have offered a place for courts
and litigants to begin the painstaking process of altering conduct and
eventually shaping attitudes. If the Court's intent was to generate
understanding rather than grudging compliance, then, at a minimum,
it would have proved a prudent investment to outline why the right to
counsel mattered. The Court may have had legitimate concerns about
delineating the precise point at which the right to counsel attached,
but those worries did not relieve it of its obligation to explain the
process the right afforded. Ultimately, the Court may have missed the
mark because it lost sight of its audience.
Or perhaps one should say audiences. The Court appears to have
underestimated the potential breadth of its audiences. Justice Black
certainly appreciated that the opinion needed to address lower courts
in explaining the reasons that Betts had failed to offer a workable
approach to the assignment of counsel in state proceedings. But
perhaps out of a combination of deference to the states and fear that
intruding too much on their authority would threaten the opinion's
unanimity, Justice Black seemed to have forgotten that the decision's
85. Kluger, supra note 81, at 698 (discussing that the Justices who were initially
reluctant to join the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education realized that




message needed to reach beyond that narrow band. The decision
would also serve to instruct defense counsel of the critical role they
played in bringing fairness to the process. It would clarify for state
funding authorities the state's obligation to devise a system that
provided counsel for those who could not afford their own. As
importantly, it would inform future generations about that which the
average accused had the right to expect and demand from the exercise
of the right to counsel. A more fully realized opinion would not have
locked in a singular conception of the role of counsel or its limits.
Rather, it would have begun to lay a more solid foundation for the
future development of the role of counsel in the criminal justice
system.
Instead, the Court's decision misjudged the political landscape onto
which the decision would be overlaid. Granted, in retrospect, the
Gideon decision turned out to be an enormously popular Warren
Court decision, aided no doubt by Anthony Lewis' much celebrated
book Gideon's Trumpet which put a face on the rulingY When
Hollywood cast Henry Fonda in the role of Clarence Gideon, the
American public may have warmly envisioned the accused and
embraced the outcome." But it is unlikely that most Americans
viewed the average accused criminal quite so sympathetically. The
Court's mandate was thus broader than it imagined. It needed to
make the case that even when politically unpopular, the right to
counsel serves a critical function in a free society. Having counsel
available not only checks the power of the state on behalf of the
guilty, but operates as a crucial safeguard for all who might face
charges in our courts. Providing a meaningful safeguard to every
accused also meant addressing the economic implications of the right
to counsel for states. In hindsight, it is hard to imagine that the
opinion could have missed the massive economic impact of providing
counsel in all serious cases and that this price ticket threatened the
meaningful implementation of the guarantee." The new mandate to
states had the potential to be read as an invitation to lower standards
of performance as a necessary side-effect of providing counsel to large
numbers of indigent defendants. The Court could have expressed its
appreciation for the limits on state resources given the various and
competing demands on a finite financial pot while still makng clear
that the Sixth Amendment guarantee had weight and meaning in the
process of dispensing justice. Even in the course of noting the real
financial constraints that states would encounter, the Court could
have made plain that it expected more than a cosmetic adherence to
its ruling. But instead of acknowledging this difficulty, the Court
simply ignored this impact.
86. Lewis, supra note 7.
87. Gideon's Trumpet (Republic Studios 1980) (starring Henry Fonda).
88. See, e.g., Taylor-Thompson, Alternating Visions, supra note 9, at 2426 n.31.
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1. Anticipating the Issue of Ineffectiveness
Looking back at the Court's opinion, it is clear that more needed to
be said to avert the practice that has become all too common in many
states: tolerating ineffectiveness of counsel.5 9 One can confidently
assume that the Justices who issued the Gideon decision never
contemplated-and would most likely revile the notion-that a
sleeping lawyer or one under the influence of drugs would satisfy the
dictates of its ruling." Rather, the Court expected active participation
in the criminal process by defense counsel, not simply physical
presence.
In outlining what defense counsel adds to a criminal proceeding, the
Court established the fundamental underpinnings of the concept of
the right to counsel. The opinion, however, needed to give more
explicit expression to its view of the substance of the right to provide
meaningful guidance to lower courts and states. For example,
effective assistance had meaning that was essential to a fair trial. The
Court should have made plain that assigning any person with a license
would not sufficiently comply with the Court's intent.9" Rather, if
counsel were to provide a "guiding hand,"92 she would need to have
sufficient qualifications to handle the complex issues raised by the
case. In the context of explaining why the accused without counsel
cannot be assured a fair trial, the Court could have noted that the
unrepresented individual would lack the ability to defend herself with
the special skill and training that a competent lawyer would possess.
The Court understood that the defense lawyer's role involved
completing the adversarial system,93 but in driving home the centrality
of this role, the Court needed to describe the details of the role more
thoroughly. The adversarial process contemplates a battle between
two strong combatants, not an ambush. This formulation of the role
implies that defense counsel serves a critical function: that of
vigorously fighting the power of the state. The defense lawyer's role is
not neutral or passive. Indeed, the Court had in previous precedents
89. See, e.g., Klein, The Emperor Gideon, supra note 10, at 662.
90. See, e.g., Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that although
counsel had slept during trial, the claim of ineffective assistance lacked merit because
the court could not tell how long he had slept, what portions of the testimony he had
missed, or that the lawyer committed any errors resulting in prejudice to the accused);
People v. Badia, 552 N.Y.S.2d 439, 440-41 (App. Div. 1990) (finding that lawyer who
used heroin and cocaine throughout trial still met the standard of effective assistance
of counsel).
91. See Green, supra note 34, at 433, 438-59 (criticizing the tendency among courts
to view as qualified anyone licensed to practice law rather than someone who has
acquired the skills and legal knowledge recognized as necessary to provide competent
representation to a criminal defendant).
92. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) (cited with approval in Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963)).
93. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467 (1938).
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articulated quite convincingly that a judge could not substitute for
able counsel. 4 Rather, the zealous fight on behalf of the accused
formed the core of the role of counsel. Given the complexities of the
criminal process even in 1963, effective assistance contemplated, at a
minimum, communication skills, competence in investigation, and
mastery of the art of advocacy at the trial and sentencing stages. Each
of these dimensions of the lawyer's role was before the Court as part
of the record 95 and presented opportunities through which the Court
could fairly comment.
Making such comment would not have involved the kind of
intrusion into states' authority that would run head-on into the
Court's pre-packaged views on federalism. The Court would not have
needed to dictate the nature of the lawyer's qualifications, nor would
it have needed to draft performance standards or furnish a checklist
for lawyer's conduct. Rather, by explaining the ways in which lawyers
in criminal courts had become "necessities, not luxuries," '96 the Court's
decision could have proved more instructive to all the audiences that
would ultimately read and rely on the opinion.
A look at the Warren Court cases over the next decade reveals a
Court willing to telegraph to defense counsel information about their
role. Decisions by the Court ultimately identify when the right to
counsel attaches. 7 Later opinions explore the types of police activity
that raise constitutional questions and thereby provide direction to
defense lawyers about the sorts of conduct to which they should be
alert in safeguarding clients' rights.9 ' Of course, because Gideon pre-
dates many of these decisions, perhaps it is too much to expect that
the Court could have fashioned an elaborate guide to defense
conduct. But simply including a vision of counsel as a vigorous
advocate for the accused would have laid a floor beneath which
defense lawyers-and future considerations of effectiveness- could
94. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 61. The Court in Powell stated:
But how can a judge, whose functions are purely judicial, effectively
discharge the obligations of counsel for the accused? He can and should see
to it that in the proceedings before the court the accused shall be dealt with
justly and fairly. He cannot investigate the facts, advise and direct the
defense, or participate in those necessary conference between counsel and
accused which sometimes partake of the inviolable character of the
confessional.
Id.
95. Abe Fortas had moved to include the entire record of trial as part of the
Supreme Court submission. See Petitioner's Brief at 5, Gideon (No. 155).
96. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
97. The Court did not until this very Term extend the Gideon mandate to "any
criminal prosecution, 'whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony that
actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period,' .. . [or that leads to] a
suspended sentence that may 'end up in the actual deprivation of a person's liberty."'
Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 122 S.Ct. 1764,1767 (2002) (citations omitted).
98. See supra note II and accompanying text.
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not easily slip.99 In so doing, substandard performance might have
been seen appropriately as the functional equivalent of no counsel at
all.
2. Heading off Perfunctory Compliance
Any effort in the Gideon decision to dictate how states should
comply with the ruling could have opened the opinion to attack by
many of the other Justices who had voted to support it. However, the
amicus for the states' attorneys general offered a viable approach that
the court could have used to quiet this dissention. The amicus
recommended that the Court articulate the nature of the guarantee
and then let the states devise their own methods for putting this ruling
into practice.""° The states then would be free to elect whether they
wished to establish public defender systems, assigned counsel
programs or some other model for the provision of counsel. No
matter what system they chose, though, the Court would have
mandated that at a minimum such programs would need to safeguard
the accused's right to a fair trial.
In explaining the reasons that courts should appoint counsel to the
indigent accused, the Court again missed the opportunity to give
guidance to the states. The opinion could have examined this
obligation more fully. Obviously, an indigent accused lacks the
financial leverage to place demands on counsel. The poor defendant
cannot pay more to get more. But the Court could have used this
instance to point out that while the state had no obligation to
eliminate the relative economic differences between the wealthy
defendant and the indigent accused,'' it should pay attention to the
ways the state financed the prosecution in determining the amount of
funds necessary to mount an effective defense. The Court noted that
99. The Court did at least this much four years later in explaining the right to
counsel for juveniles in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In that case, the Court stated
that
[t]he juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law,
to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the
proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and
submit it. The child "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in
the proceedings against him."
Id. at 36 (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 69).
100. See Brief of Amici Curiae Attorneys General at 3, Gideon (No. 155).
101. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 23 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in
judgment). Justice Frankfurter noted that
a State need not equalize economic conditions.... But when a State deems
it wise and just that convictions be susceptible to review by an appellate
court, it cannot by force of its exactions draw a line which precludes
convicted indigent persons, forsooth erroneously convicted, from securing
such a review merely by disabling them from bringing to the notice of an
appellate tribunal errors of the trial court which would upset the conviction
were practical opportunity for review not foreclosed.
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"[g]overnments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast
sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of
crime."'' 2 Without dictating the precise formulas for making funding
determinations, the Court could have drawn the connection between
the need to provide funding on both sides to reach the constitutional
goal of fairness in the process.
The states also needed guidance on the process of appointment.
Obviously, specifying the particular mechanisms states should employ
to appoint counsel could have run afoul of states' authority. However,
insisting that, no matter which system states chose, the structure
should have basic safeguards that ensure compliance with the
Constitution would have served as a meaningful guide without
stepping on the states' sovereignty. The Court appropriately observed
that the fact of appointment could not legitimately depend on an
individual's economic status."3 Exercise of a right so fundamental
could not be surrendered to such a variable. Recognizing this, the
Court could easily have gone on to explain that the quality of
representation an individual accused received should also not be
contingent on personal wealth and mandated adequate funding levels
for the implementation of the defense function.
As importantly, the Court could have commented on the
independence of the defense function. By highlighting independence,
the Court might have changed the system of patronage in which
appointments of defense attorneys become dangerously linked to
pleasing the appointing judge."4 Similarly, reminding states of the
importance of prompt appointments would have been in keeping with
precedent and might have underscored the importance of this
principle. Ensuring that the defense system did not become captive to
the court either in appointment or performance seemed a key
component of the Court's fairness argument. Such observations
would not have led the Court into the improper role of managing the
affairs of states. Instead, the Court's guidance on these issues would
have enabled states to understand the expectations for a system that
complied with constitutional guarantees.
3. Conveying the Centrality of the Right to Counsel
The Court may have been so preoccupied with its own ideological
controversy over incorporation that it did not allow itself the time or
room to anticipate future debates on the right to counsel.
Nevertheless, the Court should have foreseen the harm that would
flow from a state's failure to comply with its ruling. Speaking plainly
102. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Richard Klein & Robert Spangenberg, The Indigent Defense Crisis
(1993).
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about those potential dangers could have proved instructive to the
larger public audience that the decision would ultimately reach. The
Gideon ruling did not need to answer every question about the right
to counsel. Later cases would ultimately extend the reach of the Sixth
Amendment guarantee to other aspects of the process and to
misdemeanors.' 15 But the states' experience with funding indigent
defense and tolerating less than effective assistance stands as a painful
reminder of the cost of failing to provide some clarity about the
meaning of the right to counsel. The shameful legacy of Gideon may
be the gradual but real erosion of the right to counsel in all cases.
In giving the right substance, the Court could have emphasized the
importance of maintaining a check on governmental power. Defense
lawyers in the Court's vision served a vital role in limiting the
intrusion of government and guarding against overzealous prosecution
not just on behalf of the guilty, but on behalf of anyone who might
face prosecution.1 6 Explaining that exercising this right was key to
the individual's ability to enjoy other fundamental rights would have
underscored publicly the centrality of the defense lawyer's role in
ensuring that justice is served. Such a statement would have
demonstrated that states should view the role of counsel with some
measure of deference rather than as something with which states
could easily dispense. Expressing the degree to which due process
depended on the effective performance of counsel for the accused
could have more positively shaped the ways that states, bar
associations, courts and funders viewed the role of defense counsel.
Instead, the Court's failure to articulate the due process model that
the Court envisioned paved the way for a crime control model of
criminal process that seemed to require and depend on a perfunctory
role for counsel."' If one proceeds from the premise of presuming the
guilt of the accused, or more charitably, presuming the overriding
importance of moving a large volume of cases, then all process that
follows from the individual's arrest can be half-hearted. One can
abide inadequate assistance in the form of sleeping lawyers, 8 lawyers
who fail to investigate cases or present defenses, "9 or who otherwise
105. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36-37 (1972) (extending right to
counsel to misdemeanors); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967)
(extending right to counsel to post-indictment lineup); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 444-45 (1966) (extending right to counsel to custodial police interrogation);
White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (extending right to counsel to preliminary
hearings).
106. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
107. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal
Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L.J. 1, 31-35 (1997) (noting deficiencies in
funding which lead to under-litigation).
108. See, e.g., McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 505-06 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
109. See, e.g., People v. Gaines, 473 N.E.2d 868,876 (Il. 1984) (following Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Illinois Supreme Court held that defense
lawyer's failure to present mitigating evidence at sentencing phase of capital trial did
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operate as walking violations of what one would imagine the Sixth
Amendment anticipated. Had the Court recognized the broader
foundational role of the opinion, it might have chosen to explain in
some detail to future generations why the right mattered. The Court
had the chance to do this precisely because the United States was not
experiencing a crisis in which the right to counsel might be subject to
attack or question. Obviously, it is not the role of the Court to
anticipate every possible circumstance under which the right to
counsel might face challenge. But within the boundaries of
enunciating a principle given these facts, it could have made clear
under what circumstances that right is significant and why.
Unfortunately, it opted to allow the states to determine for themselves
the substance of what the Sixth Amendment guarantees.
Consequently, the right remains under attack.
The next section explores what defense lawyers can do in light of
these developments. If the role of counsel is to have meaning, defense
lawyers will have the obligation to define what the role promises and
to develop ways to measure when individuals are delivering-or
failing to deliver-that which is required.
II. REDUCING THE DISSONANCE: EMBRACING QUALITY AS THE
MEASURE OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
The domestic war on terrorism has already given rise to substantial
dilutions in the procedural rights of individuals.'" The Justice
Department's approval and use of secret detentions and military
tribunals has exhibited, at best, a jaundiced view of the role of defense
lawyers in our system of justice."' Officials elected to safeguard a
constitutional system have been chipping away at its protections under
the guise of fighting a new enemy in innovative ways and the indigent
defense community has been slow to step forward to steer the
dialogue in directions more consistent with constitutional
requirements. Now more than ever, the indigent defense community
needs to seize the moment and the national stage to formulate and
articulate a vision of what defense lawyers do, why they do it and why
what they do has value. Defenders simply cannot afford to wait for
quality in representation to be defined for them and their clients by
courts, politicians or the public.
Too often in the past, defenders have merely waited for others to
shape the laws and practices that govern the ways that individuals
not necessarily prejudice defendant).
110. See generally William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 Yale L.J.
2137 (2002) (discussing how Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights are affected by the
war on terrorism).
111. See generally Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: The Ad
Hoc DOD Rules of Procedure, 23 Mich. J. Int'l L. 677 (2002).
1486 [Vol. 71
TUNING UP GIDEON'S TRUMPET
accused of crime will be treated in the criminal justice system.11 2 They
have operated principally as reactive strategists. Their responses to
policies that infringe on cherished liberties have been vigorous and
creative, but they have not tended to take the lead in setting the
criminal justice agenda to prevent the approval of such policies in the
first instance. In recent years, though, defenders have taken nascent
steps to reverse that pattern."1 They have begun to assume a more
active role in addressing legislative agendas, in working
collaboratively with communities to tackle criminal justice issues, and
in carving out a role for themselves and their offices as criminal justice
players."4 If defenders now cede to others-politicians, prosecutors
or courts-the task of defining that which lawyers should provide
clients in criminal cases, they run the risk that these other players may
place emphasis on issues of cost or on that which is minimally
required. In so doing, these other actors may miss or undervalue the
essential features of effective representation that defenders and their
clients know matter in the lawyer-client relationship. Worse still, the
right to counsel may be deemed dispensable in times of crisis unless
defenders vigorously work to establish that the right to counsel is not
a constitutional nicety open to sacrifice without consequence.
The task of identifying and defining the fundamentals of
representation is well within the expertise of defenders in
collaboration with their clients. Defenders know the technical
ingredients of meaningful assistance. Clients can fill out that
definition by offering important insights into that which they need and
expect from the representation. Of course, such consultation occurs
infrequently, although it would seem an obvious first step. All too
often, choices that will directly affect the lives of poor people and
people of color occur with little or no consultation with those very
individuals. 5 Instead, courts, policy makers and sometimes even
defense lawyers presume to know what is needed without
112. See generally Taylor-Thompson, Alternating Visions, supra note 9.
113. See generally Cait Clarke, Problem-Solving Defenders in the Community:
Expanding the Conceptual and Institutional Boundaries of Providing Counsel to the
Poor, 14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 401 (2001) [hereinafter Clarke, Problem-Solving
Defenders]; Kim Taylor-Thompson, Effective Assistance: Reconceiving the Role of the
Chief Public Defender, 2 J. Inst. Stud. Legal Ethics 199 (1999) [hereinafter Taylor-
Thompson, Effective Assistance].
114. In 2000, a group of chief defenders responded to this need by forming what
was then the Chief Defenders Council and later became the American Council of
Chief Defenders, a section of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association.
They meet regularly and operate as a unit to address national criminal justice policy
making, to promote fair justice systems and to ensure quality legal representation to
individuals accused of crime. See National Legal Aid and Defender Assoc., History
of NLADA, at http://www.nlada.org/About/About-HistoryNLADA (last visited Feb.
6, 2003).
115. See, e.g., Gerald P. L6pez, An Aversion to Clients: Loving Humanity and
Hating Human Beings, 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 315, 31.5-16 (1996) [hereinafter
L6pez, An Aversion to Clients].
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discussion.'" But given the importance of this right, defenders must
consult with their clients and insist that their clients' voices and views
factor into any definition of what the right to counsel encompasses.'"
Asserting such control over the definition of the role of counsel is
crucial. Regardless of minimal requirements that courts might
establish to avoid an ineffectiveness claim, defenders have it in their
power to insist that they hold themselves to a higher standard of
performance. Public defender offices at the federal and state level,
assigned counsel programs and contract providers can set as an
ambition the achievement of a level of performance that values
quality in representation and resists invitations to provide less. These
programs can set this level of performance through the
implementation of standards of performance and measures.'" Most
importantly, the objective should not be to police or penalize, but to
recognize that which defense lawyers have the potential to provide
and then to set about improving any representation that falls short of
those standards.
Obviously, expecting defenders to add to their plates the task of
defining their role and establishing performance standards to ensure
quality asks a lot. Already, the overwhelming majority of defenders
struggle to provide the best service within their power in spite of
caseload constraints and resource limitations."9 But to be able to
defend against future incursions into the right to counsel that flow
from reduced funding, case overload, and assorted policies targeting
crime, defenders will need a clear definition of what they provide and
why the public can and should expect quality defense representation.
And yet even if defenders agree that they are willing to undertake
this additional task, holding themselves out against a standard of
quality is not risk-free. Who makes the determination when someone
has or has not met those standards? What protections will the
defender have that the standards will operate as measures to improve
116. See, e.g., William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A
Comment on Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U.
Miami L. Rev. 1099, 1105 (1994) (criticizing progressive scholars for not
acknowledging that lawyers cannot avoid imposing their own views on their clients).
117. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Nunn, The Trial as Text: Allegory, Myth and Symbol in
the Adversarial Criminal Process-A Critique of the Role of the Public Defender and a
Proposal for Reform, 32 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 743 (1995).
118. Cf Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex
Ante Parity Standard, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 242, 275 (1997) (suggesting that
developing performance standards may not improve legal representation given that
effective representation requires more than minimal compliance with a checklist of
activities to be taken on behalf of a client).
119. See John B. Arango, Defense Services for the Poor, 7 Crim. Just., Spring 1992,
at 42; Clarke, Problem-Solving Defenders, supra note 113, at 403; Andy Court, Is
There a Crisis?, 15 Am. Law., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 46; Robert L. Spangenberg & Tessa J.
Schwartz, The Indigent Defense Crisis Is Chronic, 9 Crim. Just., Summer 1994, at 13,
13-14.
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the quality of representation rather than to punish those who are
deemed below the standard? Although these questions will need to
be addressed, they should not derail the effort to ensure that quality is
infused in the representation that clients receive in criminal cases.
As a whole, defenders want to provide exemplary service to their
clients."1 They openly embrace quality as a right that their clients
deserve. But defining quality-beyond a vague sense of knowing it
when one sees it-presents the real challenge. At a minimum, quality
representation must mean that the lawyer's aid enhances the ability of
individuals accused of crimes to receive representation that satisfies
their basic needs and assists them in avoiding future legal
entanglements.
Some defenders have already begun the task of identifying and
defining quality in representation. Over the last few decades,
defenders have participated in a variety of efforts sponsored by the
ABA '2 and the National Legal Aid and Defender Association
("NLADA") 122 to think hard about that which defense lawyers should
provide. More recently, between 1991 and 2001, the Harvard
University Kennedy School of Government hosted the Executive
Session on Public Defense ("Executive Session"). 123  Thirty
participants, including state public defender leaders, assigned counsel
managers, one prosecutor, a legislator, a social worker, a journalist
and criminal justice experts, attended a series of three day meetings
focused on identifying critical issues in indigent defense. What
emerged? In defining what it meant to provide quality representation,
the members of the Executive Sessions agreed that zealous
representation to individual clients is an essential threshold. 124 The
participants recognized that clients are depending on lawyers to
facilitate their interaction with a system that may otherwise be
120. See generally Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 Clev. St. L.
Rev. 175 (1983); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to
Sustain Public Defenders, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1239 (1993) [hereinafter Ogletree,
Beyond Justifications].
121. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 5-1.1 (1993); IJA-ABA Standards
for Juvenile Justice: A Summary and Analysis Part 1 (1980).
122. Compendium of Standards for Indigent Defense Systems (2000), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/indigentdefense/compendium/welcome.html (last visited
Feb. 6, 2003); Defender Training and Development Standards (1997), available at
http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender Standards/DefenderTrainingStandards
(last visited Feb. 6, 2003); Standards for the Administration of Assigned Counsel
Systems (1989), available at http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/998926188.
407/Blackltr.doc (last visited Feb. 6, 2003).
123. I attended these sessions as a participant. See Executive Session, at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/criminaljustice/executive-sessions/espd.htm (last visited
Feb. 6, 2003).
124. See Cait Clarke & Christopher Stone, Bolder Management for Public Defense:
Leadership in Three Dimensions, Nov. 2001, available at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/criminaljustice/executive-sessions/espd-Clarke-Stone.pdf
(last visited Feb. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Clarke & Stone, Bolder Management].
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incomprehensible and hostile.25 But while individual representation
does and should figure centrally in the defense lawyer's work, the
Executive Sessions participants concluded that quality representation
needs to extend beyond the individual client. 2 Given the context in
which they operate-the courtroom and the larger community-
defenders need to develop a broader definition of quality
representation, one that envisions defenders engaging in a public
education role with the criminal justice community and general
public.127 And defenders need to engage in collaborative efforts
designed to increase fairness in the ways that we address crime.
Similar efforts have been undertaken by federal and state defender
offices that have proved in other instances to be trend setters in the
manner in which they perceive and perform their roles, and by
smaller, community-based offices that have set about to re-imagine
the work of the defense lawyer and to defy trends. 2 ' These efforts
can offer a guide into the process of identifying the component parts
of quality in service and ideas about the methods for measuring
whether it has been provided. By looking at the best of what
defenders do, one can begin to build a framework that includes the
features necessary to bring about quality in representation. Armed
with that framework, the defenders can then set about devising tools
to measure compliance with those standards. Above all, the standard
of quality must remain flexible enough to change with the times, to
develop as knowledge develops and laws change. It must be broad
enough to encompass the various skill sets that lawyers as good
problem solvers bring to the table. And it must include clients' views
and perceptions about representation in understanding the nature of
the problems to be addressed and to develop effective means to
address those problems in conjunction with the client.
In any effort to develop a framework for identifying the
components of a quality product, stepping outside one's field to glean
lessons from others who have undertaken a similar task can be
enormously helpful. The medical profession's recent experience with
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., Mark H. Moore et al., "The Best Defense Is No Offense": Preventing
Crime through Effective Public Defense, Working Paper No. 02-07-03, Apr. 2002,
available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/criminaljustice/publications/best-defense.pdf
[hereinafter "The Best Defense Is No Offense"].
127. See generally Taylor-Thompson, Effective Assistance, supra note 113
(discussing the need for chief defenders to break out of traditionally isolated roles and
to begin conceiving of themselves and their offices as key players in the criminal
justice system).
128. For example, in February 2002, the Defender Division of the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts sponsored a two-day conference on quality in indigent
defense for federal and state defenders. I served as both consultant and member of
the faculty as attendees worked to define quality in representation and to find ways to
provide it in both the state and federal criminal justice systems.
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managed care environments and the pressure to define that which the
profession should be providing offers a rich example.
A. Lessons to be Gleaned from the Health Care Profession
The issues that the health care profession has faced in recent years
eerily shadow those experienced in the defense community-
particularly in indigent defense. The push to contain medical costs
has inspired quite controversial efforts to constrict the care provided
by medical professionals. Third parties-which include insurers,
hospital officials and government players-have attempted to usurp
control over the services that medical professionals deliver without
having engaged in consultation with doctors or patients about the best
ways to manage care. In an effort to combat this trend and to exercise
greater control over the activities of the profession, a number of
healthcare professionals have hunkered down to determine critically
and comprehensively the sort of care that meets a standard of quality.
As a first step, the Institute of Medicine ("IOM") has embraced a
broad definition of quality. 29 It defines quality of care as "the degree
to which health services for individuals and populations increase the
likelihood of desired health outcomes and are consistent with current
professional knowledge.""13 " This definition has gained wide
acceptance in the formulation of practical approaches to quality
assessment in the profession. 31  One reason for its success is its
insistence that quality is not a static concept and, rather, is adaptive
depending on current professional knowledge and attendant
expectations. Within these bounds, defining quality and making it
measurable serves dual objectives: health care professionals can judge
the effectiveness of their efforts, and patients can know what to expect
of the care that they receive. In the end, a workable definition of
quality that can be identified and quantified offers the profession the
tools to discover and even to raise the standard of health care that
communities receive.
What is of particular note in the IOM definition is that it embraces
a broader vision of service for the health profession. The IOM
deliberately chose the term "health services" as the focus of the
129. The Institute of Medicine is a private, non-governmental organization
associated with the National Academy of Sciences. The TOM mission is to provide
objective information and advice concerning health and science policy to the
government, the corporate sector, the health profession and the public. See Institute
of Medicine, at http://www.iom.edu/iom/iomhome.nsf/Pages/About+the+IOM (last
visited Feb. 6, 2003).
130. See Institute of Medicine, Medicare: A Strategy for Quality Assurance 21
(1990), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309042305/html/ (last visited Feb. 6,
2003).
131. See Measuring the Quality of Health Care (Molla S. Donaldson ed., 1999),
available at http://www.nap.edu/readingroom/books/quality/report.html (last visited
Feb. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Donaldson].
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content of care.1 2 Quality, necessarily then, extends beyond the more
narrow boundaries of "medical" services, such that quality becomes a
multi-dimensional construct.'33 For example, even the most brilliant
medical procedure depends to some extent on health-related services
and can be undermined by inadequate follow-up and family resources
to continue care after the procedure is completed. 3 4 Quality must
infuse all aspects of service along a continuum of care if it is to have
genuine meaning and impact. Moreover, the IOM definition insists
that quality address the technical aspects of providing care-health
care professionals must keep abreast of professional knowledge.'35
This means, at a minimum, that they must possess the technical
proficiency to provide specific services to patients.1 36 Furthermore,
the TOM model recognizes that the assessment of quality also includes
interpersonal features. How well does the health care professional
communicate with patients? Is she attentive to her patients' concerns
and needs? 37 Finally, the definition contemplates a system by which a
quality assessment will incorporate structural measures.138
Perhaps what makes the definition most interesting is that which it
does not include. It does not advert to, or acknowledge that, resource
constraints might hamper quality. Critics have reproached the TOM
for this omission. But the 1OM appears to have deliberately chosen to
avoid mentioning finances, consistent with its view that quality of care
should not depend on the patient's wealth to avoid having quality
judged on a sliding scale. Quality must incorporate basic elements
that inure to the benefit of the patient regardless of funding. Of
course, a clear understanding of the availability or lack of funds can
prod providers to build in assurances that the health care delivery will
not waste resources. But resource availability should be assessed in
light of what is expected to be delivered, rather than operating as a
frame to restrict that which should be provided.139
Still, the 1OM definition of quality care took steps not to promise
too much. Health care professionals, like other professional service
providers, cannot certify that they will deliver a specific outcome,
given that each procedure involves uncertainty and risk. But the
132. See Henry T. Ireys et al., Assuring Quality of Care for Children With Special
Needs in Managed Care Organizations: Roles for Pediatricians, Pediatrics, Aug. 1996,
at 178 [hereinafter Assuring Quality of Care].
133. Id.
134. See id. at 5.
135. See Paul D. Turner & Louis G. Pol, Beyond Patient Satisfaction, 15 Am.
Marketing Ass'n J. of Health Care Marketing 45 (1995).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See Mark S. Litwin et al., RAND, Prostate Cancer Patient Outcomes and
Choice of Providers: Development of an Infrastructure for Quality Assessment (2000),
available at http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1227/lndex.html (last visited
Feb. 21, 2003).
139. See Donaldson, supra note 131, at 4.
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definition's emphasis on the "desired outcome" suggests that in
providing those services, the health care professional must assess the
risk and take steps to minimize it. The definition also contemplates
that the health care professional will learn what outcomes are desired.
This means consulting with patients, including them in the process of
understanding the array of potential outcomes, and, then within that
range, identifying the outcome that is "desired."
Of course, perspectives on quality can differ and compete. The
insurer's or employer's perspective may cause each to measure quality
according to the ways in which health care providers spend premium
dollars, with particular emphasis on avoiding unnecessary
expenditures. 4  Patients evaluate care in terms of its responsiveness
to their individual medical needs.14' Physicians often perceive quality
in terms of the outcome of the intervention such that the biological
status of the patient has improved.142 Striking a balance among these
competing views and expectations presents an important challenge,
but the areas of agreement that emerge may forge the central
elements of any definition of quality.
1. Benchmarks of Performance
By design, assessments of care extend beyond the individual
encounter between patient and health care professional to include the
health plan and the system of care provided to a community. 143 At the
individual level, the practitioner must attend to a wide range of
patient needs, negotiate clear treatment objectives with the patient,
and explain levels of risk and constraints on knowledge.144 To meet
these needs, the practitioner must possess good interpersonal and
counseling skills in addition to technical expertise. At the health plan
level, the profession must assure that measures are in place to ensure
that patients can receive appropriate health care at a level of quality
consistent across the program. 145  This does not mean setting and
adhering to rigid protocols without the possibility of deviation.
Patients rarely fit neatly into proscribed guidelines. 146 The standard of
care must maintain sufficient flexibility to allow individual
adjustments based on clinical judgment while ensuring such
consistency. 47 At the community level, the goal of ensuring quality of
140. Elizabeth A. McGlynn, Six Challenges in Measuring the Quality of Health
Care, Health Affairs, May-June 1997, at 3.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See Assuring Quality of Care, supra note 132, at 178.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 12.
146. See R. Heather Palmer, Process-Based Measures of Quality: The Need for
Detailed Clinical Data in Large Health Care Databases, 1997 Annals Internal Med.
127, 733-38.
147. See Assuring Quality of Care, supra note 132, at 12.
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care involves reviewing the extent to which a community receives
appropriate service through its health care delivery systems.
Questions regarding accessibility of care, a community's willingness or
ability to utilize medical service, and the performance of the health
care facilities available to a community factor into the picture of
quality at this level."'
Benchmarks of performance enable the health care profession to
promote quality of care at each of these levels. While outcomes
necessarily warrant some attention in defining quality, the principal
focus for measuring quality appears to be on process.1 49  The
underlying justification for such a focus is that best practices will likely
improve outcomes. 5 ' Thus, in determining whether a provider is
delivering quality in care, one would observe and measure the
provider's interventions. Does she order diagnostic tests? What
medical procedures does she perform? What drugs does she
prescribe? Are these processes of care widely accepted as positively
affecting outcomes?
Above all, the health care profession has come to recognize the
importance of establishing benchmarks that represent a measurable
and attainable level of excellence.15" ' Setting a standard that the
profession cannot achieve offers little guidance and encourages
providers to substitute their own definitions of adequacy. As
importantly, the benchmark of performance should by definition
always exceed the level of the average performance, challenging the
profession to stretch its performance to attain the goal."5 In fleshing
out the features of the benchmark, all superior performers should
contribute, but the benchmark needs to take care that providers with
high performance and very low numbers of cases "do not unduly
influence benchmark levels." '153 Such performers might be able to
perform certain services and provide a level of care that directly
relates to their low numbers that would, in the end, skew the
benchmark for providers with an average or above average volume of
patients.
148. Id.
149. Concepts Behind the ABC Method, in Center for Outcomes & Effectiveness
Research & Education, Univ. of Alabama at Birmingham, Achievable Benchmarks of
Care (ABC) User Manual, at http://main.uab.edu/show.asp?durki=14504 (last visited
Feb. 21, 2003) [hereinafter Concepts of Care].
150. See Palmer, supra note 1.46, at 5 (noting that "outcome-based measures may
indicate the need for improvement but do not reveal what is necessary to improve
health care. Process-based measures identify specific processes of care that need to
be changed and whether specific changes can improve these processes"); Concepts of
Care, supra note 149, at 3
151. Concepts of Care, supra note 149, at 1.
152. Id. at 3.
153. Id.
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2. Quality Care as Public Message
The choice to set benchmarks for quality care has emerged
principally in reaction to a dramatically changing environment.
External pressure from insurers, employers and managed care
companies to increase effectiveness and lower costs has been
instrumental in prodding the medical profession to examine its
delivery of quality care. 154 As importantly, a growing sophistication
among consumers demanding more effective clinical care and greater
accountability for quality has only added to that. 155 These demands
have raised the stakes in the marketplace among health care providers
to improve service to gain a competitive edge in attracting
consumers.156 Recognizing these changes, pharmaceutical companies
and health care providers have begun to target the consumer directly
with advertisements touting prescription medications and promises of
superior treatment. 5 As a result, patients have been less willing to
accept without question that which the medical profession chooses to
deliver particularly if the care being offered does not measure up to
the patients' raised expectations."'
Apart from the changed environment, the move to embrace quality
care has developed out of an internal concern: the health profession
has wanted to improve the care they give.159 Managed care has pit the
medical profession against professionals who are not necessarily
trained in medicine, but who are empowered to make decisions that
second-guess prescribed care. This contest has forced some
introspection as doctors have found themselves caught in the middle
between two opposing poles. On one end, patients demand that
doctors provide all that can be imagined, while efforts to control costs
press doctors to focus on efficient utilization of their services.160 What
operates as a buffer of sorts is the doctor's own ethical commitment to
help her patients. 16' Helping patients may mean being realistic in
what doctors offer and promise, but it does not contemplate providing
less than quality care to remain within a budget. Given that context,
articulating that which constitutes quality care becomes key.
154. See generally McGlynn, supra note 140.
155. See, e.g., Barbara Mintzes et al., Influence of Direct to Consumer
Pharmaceutical Advertising & Patients' Requests on Prescribing Decisions: Two Site
Cross Sectional Survey, Brit. Med. J., Feb. 2002, at 278-79, http://www.whp-
apsf.ca/en/documents/docindex.htm [hereinafter Mintzes].
156. William M. Sage & Peter J. Hammer, Competing on Quality of Care: The Need
to Develop a Competition Policy for Health Care Markets, 32 U. Mich. J.L. Reform
1069 (1999).
157. See Aparna Kumar, Doctors Split on Usefulness of Drug Advertising, L.A.
Times, Jan. 14, 2003, at A12; Mintzes, supra note 155, at 278-79.
158. See supra note 155.
159. See generally Donaldson, supra note 131.




In rescuing the definition of care from others who might define it
solely within a cost-control framework, the heath care profession has
sent an unmistakable message: Quality is vital. Moreover, quality can
be identified, measured and achieved. Embracing a standard of
quality in care obviously exerts pressure on the health care profession,
but it seems the sort of pressure that the health care profession stands
ready to embrace. By promoting quality as a goal in care, doctors can
begin to demonstrate that they do not stand in an adversarial position
to their patients. Rather, doctors can openly acknowledge that
patients are critical partners in identifying that which constitutes
quality in health care. The willingness to promote quality and to be
held accountable enables doctors to underscore that patients' views
matter and that patient care rather than financial constraints should
inform the development of standards of care. 162
Seizing on quality as the standard also helps to set and regulate
expectations. The process of developing a benchmark of performance
gives guidance for judging an individual caregiver's performance.
That benchmark also recognizes and articulates to the public the
continuing need for examination and input to ensure that there is no
slippage in care. Indeed, measuring the gaps between expectations
and experience can help health care professionals as well as the public
identify areas for improvement 3 and educate third parties about
resource needs to close gaps that might become apparent.
The measurement process makes clear to a broader audience both
the factors embedded in quality care and that quality should be a
matter of concern to them. A range of methods to determine whether
providers actually dispense quality care can be useful. One method
involves peer review. This measure contemplates that physicians will
review the care that other doctors in their area of practice provide
with an eye toward raising the level of care as a whole. 64 This again
delivers an important message to doctors that the assessment of
quality will be framed by an understanding of what it means to
provide medical care. An additional method the health care
profession utilizes is patient surveys. 6' Such surveys offer critical
feedback to doctors about the ways that patients perceive the care
they receive while simultaneously informing patients that they have a
right to expect technical expertise in prevention, detection and
treatment of illnesses. But patient surveys also notify patients about
less technical aspects of their care. The information adduced on such
162. Id. at 4.
163. See Paul D. Turner & Louis G. Pol, Beyond Patient Satisfaction, J. of Health
Care Marketing, Fall 1995, at 9.
164. Id.
165. See Norm Andrzejewski & Rosalinda T. Lagua, Use of a Customer Satisfaction
Survey by Health Care Regulators: A Tool for Quality Management, Pub. Health
Rep., May 15, 1997, at 206, 1997 WL 9736204.
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surveys conveys to the patient that the profession intends to track data
about the health care professional's courtesy, respect, and clear
communications as part of the service that patients receive.166 Finally,
in collecting information about patient health outcomes, the medical
profession serves the community by informing them, through the
availability of comparative data, of those providers that meet, exceed,
or fall below acceptable levels of quality in care.'67
Obvious differences emerge when one compares the health care
profession and indigent criminal defense. But the lessons to be
discerned through the health profession's experience are nonetheless
instructive. At a minimum, the health care profession has
demonstrated the possibility of-and need for-a working definition
of quality in the provision of service. The profession has then set
standards for measuring and achieving it. Even while acknowledging
that quality may be a somewhat amorphous construct, the profession
has mapped a procedure for giving it definition that can be used to
elevate the level of practice. The next section applies these lessons in
the context of indigent criminal defense representation.
B. Rewriting Gideon's Legacy
In the ambition to provide effective assistance, indigent defense
service providers share the view that a zealous commitment to clients
functions as an essential threshold.'68 Clients in the criminal justice
system often need help navigating a system that seems foreign to them
and all too often operates against them. The tremendously complex
responsibility that defenders undertake in representation demands a
passionate dedication to a client's goals, a depth of perception about
the reactions and biases of a variety of audiences, and unfailing
ingenuity in the face of often overwhelming odds. But while quality
representation includes attending to the needs of an individual client,
it is not confined to that sphere. Given the context in which defenders
operate-in the courtroom and in the larger community-defenders
need to develop a more expansive definition of quality representation,
one that engages defenders in collaborative strategies to increase
fairness in the ways that society addresses issues of crime.16 9
166. See, e.g., Oren Renick et al., The Searchers II: How Consumers Can Find
Cost-Effective, Quality Health Care, Employee Benefits J., Dec. 1, 2002, at 28 (noting
that patient surveys empower consumers at the moment of choice to buy health care),
2002 WL 15846975.
167. See, e.g., Donna 0. Farley et al, RAND, Testing CAHPS Health Plan
Performance Reports in the Florida Medical Program (2000) (noting that the health
plan performance report was designed in part to help consumers compare health
plans and to make more informal health care choices), http://www.rand.org/
publications/MR/MR1218 (last visited Feb. 21, 2003).
168. See generally Ogletree, Beyond Justifications, supra note 120.
169. See generally Taylor-Thompson, Alternating Visions, supra note 9.
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Such a definition of quality might appear to incorporate more
dimensions than would initially seem necessary or prudent. Fears
about the potential misuse of new and broader standards should not
be underestimated. Defenders have experienced, with troubling
frequency, the wrath of both funding authorities and the public for
engaging in the work that the Constitution compels.7 " Giving critics
an additional tool-or handy excuse-to scrutinize the work of
defenders makes most defenders and their offices understandably
nervous. Nevertheless, defenders stand to gain from such a definition
of quality. The defense bar rails against its members who purport to
represent clients, but more often function as "walking violations of the
sixth amendment."'7 1 Defenders should take the creation of this
definition as an opportunity to be imaginative, rather than cautious, in
identifying the attributes of their role. Defining their own standard of
quality enables indigent defense service providers to prove that which
they profess and fundamentally believe: that an indigent accused can
receive quality representation even though she does not pay for the
service she receives.
With that goal in mind, any definition of the role of counsel should
unashamedly embrace quality. Borrowing from the 10M definition,
one might choose to define quality in representation as "the degree to
which legal assistance, consistent with professional knowledge,
safeguards the interests of the individual accused and increases the
likelihood of fairness in the criminal justice system."' This proposed
definition invites analysis in three different arenas. First, what
constitutes quality in individual representation? Second, what is
necessary to drive quality through an office? And third, what steps
assure quality for a community in addressing issues of fairness in the
criminal justice system as a whole? By thinking about quality in
individual and systemic terms, defenders can begin to give the role of
counsel the meaning that it has lacked.
Both an individual and the systemic focus are crucial. Being an
effective advocate for an individual charged with a criminal offense
contemplates a commitment and zeal that motivates the defender to
demand excellence of herself. 3 Many defenders, however, have
170. Id. at 24, 31. For example, defender budgets have suffered severe cuts largely
because the public perceives defenders as contributing to the crime problem by
representing the accused. See Rebecca Marcus, Racism in Our Courts: The
Underfunding of Public Defenders and its Impact Upon Racial Minorities, 22 Hastings
Const. L. Q. 219, 224 (1994).
171. David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 2
(1973) (reporting the development of the phrase "walking violation of the sixth
amendment" by trial judges trying to capture the ineffective assistance that had
become a common phenomenon).
172. The quoted material is the definition of quality in representation advocated by
this article.
173. See Ogletree, Beyond Justifications, supra note 120, at 1246-47.
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come to recognize the limitations of individual representation in
effecting lasting change in the justice system.74 Strategies that once
successfully advanced clients' goals have become less effective in
today's environment. Motions to suppress evidence too often become
little more than opportunities to learn more about the government's
case rather than serving as chances for courts to step in to redress a
violation. The legal landscape has become less alert to-and more
tolerant of-abuses that occur in interactions between individuals and
police."'5 The political environment rewards politicians who endorse
tougher criminal sanction regardless of their ultimate effectiveness.176
The social setting fuels a mounting fear of crime that orients some
jurors towards conviction in a desperate effort to strike a blow against
crime.177 Even as defenders bring ingenuity and passion to the fight
inside the courtroom, confining their advocacy to that arena may, in
the end, disserve the very clients they seek to help.
In response to these circumstances, defenders have begun to
address the broader needs of both individual clients and the
communities from which their clients come."7 ' While Gideon may
have made clear that the right to representation extended to state
proceedings, the practice of implementing that ruling and providing
substance to the idea of zealous defense advocacy has evolved since
then. Defenders no longer define quality representation solely by
what happens within the confines of the courthouse. Rather, the
defender's advocacy role extends outside of the courtroom and into
the communities in which their clients reside.179 Defenders are
working toward changing justice policies that threaten individual
liberties, all without sacrificing the effective representation of clients
in individual criminal cases.' This expanded definition of the
defender's role not only brings inherent challenges and risks, but it
174. See, e.g., Terry Brooks & Shubhangi Deoras, New Frontiers in Public Defense,
17 Crim. Just. 51 (2002); Brennan Center for Justice, N.Y.U. School of Law, Taking
Public Defense to the Streets, http://www.brennancenter.org/resources/cji-series/
article-l.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2003) [hereinafter Taking Public Defense to the
Streets].
175. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (noting that the
"actual motivations of individual officers" are irrelevant to a Fourth Amendment
analysis of the validity of a search and seizure); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
913 (1984) (establishing good-faith exception to Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule).
176. See generally Clarke, Problem-Solving Defenders, supra note 113.
177. See, e.g., Benjamin Steiner, Folk Knowledge as Legal Action: Death Penalty
Judgments and the Tenant of Early Release in a Culture of Mistrust and Punitiveness,
33 L. & Soc. Rev. 461, 464-65 (1999) (noting that an uneasiness about crime provides
a rationale to the public for harsh punishment).
178. See generally "The Best Defense Is No Offense," supra note 126 (advocating
that defender offices seek ways to make clear that they are committed to reducing
crime in communities).
179. See Taking Public Defense to the Streets, supra note 174, at 1, 7-10.
180. Id. at 7; Clarke, Problem-Solving Defenders, supra note 113, at 407.
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also cries out for the development of tools to measure whether
defenders are achieving quality in these new areas.
Defenders might begin by formulating their own benchmarks. A
number of defender offices are widely recognized as providing
comprehensive and quality service to clients. 1  Institutional
defenders such as the Public Defender Service of the District of
Columbia and the Defender Association of Seattle have earned
reputations within the defense community for innovative and client-
centered representation." 2 Similarly, relatively newer and smaller
community-based programs like the Neighborhood Defender Service
of Harlem and The Bronx Defenders have taken traditional
approaches and expanded them to include practices that are
community-informed and community-sensitive.8 3  One recently
reorganized office, Knoxville Tennessee Community Law Office, has
pushed the boundaries further in creating a one stop-shopping model
of representation for the indigent accused, enabling clients to address
a wide range of criminal and civil legal needs in one setting.1
4
Gleaning practices from these offices may offer a starting point in
formulating benchmarks of quality practice that defenders as a whole
would want to emulate.
1. Benchmarks in Individual Representation
In developing a framework for considering the key elements of
quality in individual representation, defenders might pose a series of
normative questions to focus their efforts. For example, defenders
would need to examine that which they would consider the
representational role of lawyers assigned to provide assistance to
clients charged with crimes. What is the objective of each
representation and who should be involved in that decision? What
should the standards for quality performance be? What are the
essential skill and knowledge sets that enable defenders to fulfill the
representational mission? How is the success of a representation
determined and by whom? Using these questions as a guide, the
defenders could then examine the practices of the leading offices in
formulating standards of performance.
In determining the objective of the representation, defenders in
those offices that have gained national reputations for the quality of
their service work together with their clients to define the problem to
181. See Clarke, Problem-Solving Defenders, supra note 113, at 448-54 (noting the
success of the public defender offices in Harlem, the Bronx and Washington, D.C.).
182. Id.
183. See The Bronx Defenders, at http://www.bronxdefenders.org (last visited Feb.
21, 2003); Neighborhood Defender Service of Harlem, at http://www.ndsny.org (last
visited Feb. 21, 2003).
184. See Knox County Public Defender Community Law Office, at
http://www.pdknox.org/800main.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2003).
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be addressed and to identify the objectives and strategies to achieve
those objectives. 85 The lawyer's role by design is client-centered.186
The relationship does not operate in a top-down fashion in which the
defender determines and then dictates the approach to address the
client's problem. Instead, the relationship is collaborative. Both the
client and the defender bring overlapping, valuable information and
skills to the encounter that should inform the plan of action in the
lawyer-client relationship.8 7 Developing a relationship of trust and
open communication means maximizing contact and sharing
information related to the case and the client's concerns. This
relationship also contemplates recognizing and appreciating cultural
differences that may permeate and affect the rapport between the
lawyer and the client.188 Ultimately, this working collaboration
envisions that the client will play a critical role not just in deciding
whether to plead guilty, to proceed to trial or to testify, but in every
aspect of the case as it proceeds.
The standards for quality performance in a legal proceeding appear
to involve factors that enhance the lawyer's ability to advocate fiercely
on behalf of her client. For example, to handle and prepare for the
complexities of a criminal proceeding, these defender offices have
come to regard early intervention 89  in cases and vertical
representation.9 as fundamental requirements. Early entry into a
case allows the defender to become better informed about the facts of
the client's legal case and to track investigative leads that with the
185. See generally Clarke, Problem-Solving Defenders, supra note 113, at 448-57.
186. See Ogletree, Beyond Justifications, supra note 120; Deborah L. Rhode,
Ethical Perspectives in Legal Practice, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 589, 605 (1985) (noting that in
criminal defense, the "case for undiluted partisanship is most compelling"); Abbe
Smith, "Nice Work If You Can Get It": "Ethical" Jury Selection in Criminal Defense,
67 Fordham L. Rev. 523, 529-30 (1998).
187. See Gerald P. L6pez, The Work We Know So Little About, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1,
9 (1989).
188. See generally Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural
Competence in Lawyers, 8 Clinical L. Rev. 33 (2001).
189. The Neighborhood Defender Service of Harlem has a 24 hour call-in line to
permit clients to gain access to a lawyer. The Public Defender Service for the District
of Columbia has a "duty day" lawyer-a lawyer available to the public on a daily basis
to answer questions and to assist individuals who have information that they may be
wanted by the police. In those instances, the duty day lawyer will accompany an
accused to the police station for a voluntary surrender and will endeavor to protect
the accused by making clear in the booking process that her client asserts her right to
silence.
190. Vertical representation requires the assignment of a lawyer to each individual
client at the arrest stage such that the defender maintains responsibility for the case
from start to finish. See Janet A. Gilboy & John R. Schmidt, Replacing Lawyers: A
Case Study of the Sequential Representation of Criminal Defendants, 70 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 1, 13 (1979); Taylor-Thompson, Alternating Visions, supra note 9, at
2428. Some offices, such as the Neighborhood Defender Service of Harlem, have
added a team component to the vertical representation model with lawyer and non-
lawyer team members providing services to the client throughout the representation.
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passage of time would likely become less productive. Vertical
representation permits a continuity of contact between the client and
her lawyer that can build client confidence and can enable the
relationship to evolve over time.
If the client elects to proceed to trial, the practice within these
offices suggests an organizational structure that provides technical
support for the lawyer's advocacy in defense of her client. 9 ' This
means that she must conduct an investigation of the underlying facts
that exceeds a perfunctory examination of witness statements and
police reports. Given the press of cases, defenders typically work
collaboratively with staff investigators assigning them the
responsibility of interviewing government witnesses and locating
defense witnesses. At a minimum, the defender's role at trial
contemplates confronting adverse witnesses, rather than sitting mute
because she lacks the necessary information to develop lines of cross
that come from a full understanding of the witnesses' claims and
potential areas of bias.
The goal of providing quality assistance demands technical
proficiency commensurate with the complexity of the case. The
lawyer must understand how to develop a theory of the case that
creates an imperative to acquit. She must understand the methods by
which she can raise and create doubt in the minds of the factfinders.
To perform her role effectively, the defender must have a working
knowledge of the governing law and precedents such that she can
raise evidentiary issues and formulate appropriate objections and
requests for limiting instructions. As importantly, the defender must
understand the spoken and unspoken biases in the room so that she
can challenge presumptions that may operate against her client.
Every case brings unique facts and issues that demand both the
defender's creativity and fresh look. Once the defender succumbs to
the view that cases are fungible-that a particular case is "just another
drug case"-then she has begun an all too dangerous descent below
an acceptable standard of performance.
While the defender's trial expertise is vital, it is only a portion of the
requisite advocacy skills. She will need sufficient expertise and
knowledge to evaluate and negotiate a case. Being able to appreciate
the strength and weaknesses of the government's case assists the
lawyer in gaining sufficient leverage to negotiate on behalf of her
client. Given the potential of collateral consequences flowing from
any decision to negotiate a case, lawyers, at a minimum, must
maintain a working knowledge of the potential sentencing
consequences of any negotiated settlement of the charges. 192 Her
191. See generally Ogletree, Beyond Justifications, supra note 120, at 1287
(describing the divisions supporting trial work at the Public Defender Service for the
District of Columbia).
192. See generally Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance
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negotiation skills must be buttressed by excellent communication
skills that not only permit her to explain complex concepts clearly and
persuasively, but also allow her to communicate across lines of
difference. Economic and racial differences between the lawyer and
the client can often operate as a barrier to relationships of trust unless
the lawyer develops the sort of sensitivity that allows her to see issues
from perspectives other than her own.'93
Effective advocacy at sentencing draws equally on specialized skills.
Too often, lawyers fail to recognize that the sentencing stage demands
creative and aggressive advocacy. With the advent of sentencing
guidelines and mandatory sentencing schemes, the range within which
a judge can maneuver may be limited.'94 This reality often lures
lawyers into the mistaken belief that little can be done to affect the
outcome. But the better offices recognize that sentencing remains a
critical stage in the proceedings and demands attention and creative
passion. The legislatively imposed limitations on the judge's
discretion may place a greater emphasis on the negotiation stage to
place the client in an acceptable sentencing range. Or, if the
sentencing scheme permits judges to depart from guideline
constraints, the defense lawyer will need to provide sufficient
background information about her client to justify the departure."9 In
those jurisdictions where the judge's or jury's sentencing discretion is
not so strictly limited,196 the defender will need to present the sort of
mitigating evidence or factual information that encourages the court
to see the client as more than just a personification of her charges.
of Counsel & the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 697 (2002); Lea
McDermid, Comment, Deportation Is Different: Noncitizens and Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 741 (2001); Daniel J. Murphy, Guilty Pleas and the Hidden
Minefield of Immigration Consequences for Alien Defendants: Achieving a "Just
Result" by Adjusting Maine's Rule 11 Procedure, 54 Me. L. Rev. 157 (2002).
193. See generally L6pez, An Aversion to Clients, supra note 115, at 315 (reminding
an audience of progressive white lawyers that their work mandates that they push
themselves beyond the comfort of talking to other like-minded lawyers and instead to
collaborate with clients of color and their communities, to solicit their views, and to
reconceptualize goals in light of those views).
194. See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 393 (1992)
(suggesting that prosecutors exercise power over sentencing that was previously the
domain of sentencing judges); Joseph S. Hall, Guided to Injustice?: The Effect of the
Sentencing Guidelines on Indigent Defendants and Public Defense, 36 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 1331, 1341 (1999) [hereinafter Hall, Guided to Injustice?] (noting that due to loss
of judicial discretion, sentencing in the federal courts has become formulaic).
195. See Hall, Guided to Injustice?, supra note 194, at 1348 (noting changes in the
factors that federal judges can consider in granting a downward departure).
196. While some states have adopted sentencing guidelines, most still give judges
considerable discretion in sentencing. See generally Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and
Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 13, 23-24 (noting
that most state judges retain some sentencing power); Kay A. Knapp & Denis J.
Hauptly, State and Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Apples and Oranges, 25 U.C. Davis




Such advocacy necessarily begins with the defense lawyer's
relationship with her client. If she cannot see her client beyond the
charge that brings her to the office, then she will likely fail in any
effort to persuade others to treat her client differently. As a baseline,
the commitment that the defender brings to the relationship must
involve a passionate dedication to the goal of advancing the client's
interests within the bounds of the law. As importantly, the defender
must develop the ability to listen and work collaboratively with her
client. Moreover, she must resist the temptation to presume that
because of her educational advantages, she will know what is best for
her client. Given that the accused and defender may come from
different racial and socio-economic backgrounds, 97 a willingness to
consider matters from a perspective that may differ from her own is
key. Even when the defender and accused share a racial heritage,
differences in perspective may emerge that make listening and
collaborating all the more important in the relationship. Above all,
treating clients with respect and dignity seems fundamental in a
process that at times seems characterized by the indignities to which it
subjects many of its participants.
Of course, the best defender offices take these skills and obligations
as a given.9'9 What sets these offices apart from the rest is that they
routinely required reorienting their approach to public defense away
from a singular concentration on the life of a case toward a broader
focus on the life of the client. Although the criminal charge is the
likely catalyst that initiated the lawyer-client relationship, that charge
is often only the tip of the iceberg. Once the defender acknowledges
that the client is considerably more than the case that brought her
through the door, then the defender must take steps to understand the
life of that client in much greater detail. Although this approach to
lawyering has recently gained a name-holistic or whole client
advocacy-' defender offices like the Public Defender Service and
The Defender Association of Seattle have been engaged in this
practice for at least the past thirty years. 200
197. L6pez, Aversion to Clients, supra note 115, at 316.
198. See generally Ogletree, Beyond Justifications, supra note 120, it 1286-87
(describing how the Public Defender Service limits caseloads to enable iawyers to
have the time to attend to clients and to become involved in understanding their life
circumstances).
199. See Clarke, Problem Solving Defenders, supra note 113, at 429.
200. Since its inception in 1970, the Public Defender Service for the District of
Columbia maintained an Offender Rehabilitation Division that focused on providing
support services to the client as she proceeded through the criminal justice system.
See The Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia, at http://www.pdsdc.org
(last visited Feb. 21, 2003). The Defender Association of Seattle, initially organized in
1969 as a Model Cities Program, helped to form TeamChild, which provides
comprehensive services to juvenile offenders in an effort to keep them out of the
juvenile justice system. See The Defender Association, at http://www.defender.org/
resume.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2003); TeamChild, TeamChild Overview, at
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At a minimum, holistic advocacy means working with the client to
find ways to prevent future involvement with the criminal justice
system as well as working to disentangle her from her current criminal
charge. Doing both effectively requires sensitivity to the racial and
economic dynamics at play in a client's experience that may help to
explain her involvement in the criminal justice system. It also
mandates collaboration with other professionals-social workers, job
counselors, housing advocates and the like-in helping the client
advance a goal of noninvolvement in the system. Without working to
understand her clients' lives and life circumstances, the defender
cannot begin to understand how her professional intervention may
affect her clients' experiences with the system of justice and larger
community. This larger role, therefore, presupposes developing a
broader standard of performance against which to measure whether
the strategies defenders employ have a chance of meaningful change
in the clients' circumstances. 01
Why would defenders want to assume a level of performance that
places demands on them that extend beyond the actual confines of a
legal proceeding? The answer appears to be that defenders have
begun to see the benefits of such full-service lawyering.2 °2 In the
context of the technical legal role that defenders play, developing an
understanding of the community from which the client comes may
give the defender critical insights into that client's options and
challenges, support systems, and obstacles to success. More
particularly, a deeper appreciation of the environment that may have
contributed to a client's conduct can help defenders explain their
client's actions. On a more basic level, the process of treating one's
client with respect and dignity, taking the time to ascertain the client's
needs, and working in conjunction with the client to address them aids
the defender's relationship with her client. With that degree of
commitment to the client, the client herself can feel better about the
assignment of counsel in which she typically exercised no choice and
can begin to develop confidence that her lawyer will work on her
behalf against a state that does not have her interests at heart.
This enhanced notion of representation raises important questions
about when the representation ends."" The conventional formulation
of the lawyer-client relationship suggests that representation
terminates upon acquittal at trial or upon sentencing. The legal
http://www.teamchild.org/overview.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2003).
201. See L6pez, Aversion to Clients, supra note 115, at 316.
202. See Taking Public Defense to the Streets, supra note 174, at 6 (noting that in
surveys sent to over 900 defenders across the country, over half indicated that they
were currently engaged in collaborative efforts with community residents, groups or
activists in their jurisdiction).
203. See generally Anthony C. Thompson, Address to the NLADA Annual
Conference (Nov. 14, 2002), at http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/1038340494.03/
Anthony %20Thompson %20Re-entry%20speech.doc (last visited Feb. 21, 2003).
2003] 1505
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
proceeding has reached a technical conclusion and the case can be
closed. Even within this framework, however, the suggestion that the
representation has ended may be an overstatement. The incarcerated
client may continue to encounter issues, strictly related to the case,
that her defender will need to address. For example, when a client has
cases in multiple states or in state and federal court, corrections
officials often issue detainers to indicate a future hold on the client.
At times, these detainers operate in ways that thwart the court's
sentencing intent."0 4 Thus, the lawyer would need to correct this
situation because, without the lawyer's intervention, the client is often
left without any other assistance.
Under the broader formulation of the defender's role that involves
whole client advocacy, the defender and other service providers in the
defender office, by design, may continue to work with the client after
the formal criminal proceeding has terminated. Many defender
offices are beginning to extend their representation to issues facing
their clients as they re-enter their communities upon release from a
period of incarceration."" This responsibility contemplates working
with other professionals as well as their clients to address problems
that uniquely confront ex-offenders as they struggle to reintegrate into
communities. Such advocacy significantly lengthens the period of
representation and requires thought about standards of performance
as well.
2. Quality as the System's Goal
However one maps the boundaries of representation, the system of
delivery must also embrace quality. Quality representation obviously
depends on the individual lawyer's skill and commitment. But an
important condition in providing quality representation is that the
204. Take, for example, a situation where an individual is sentenced on
independent cases in federal and state court. Assume further that the lawyers in each
case have convinced the sentencing judges to allow the client to serve her sentences
concurrently. If she is in state custody at the time of the federal sentencing, the
federal sentence will not commence upon imposition of the sentence. It will instead
operate as a detainer which will mean that she will serve consecutive sentences unless
a lawyer intervenes to correct the process.
205. For example, the Community Defender Office of the Public Defender Service
for the District of Columbia sets as an ambition responding to "legal and social
service needs of newly released parolees and assist[ing] them in making a successful
transition back into the community." See The Public Defender Service for the District
of Columbia,, The Community Defender Program, at http://www.pdsdc.org/
CommunityDefender/index.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2003) [hereinafter Public
Defender - DC]. The Dade County Public Defender Office has established a
comprehensive Anti-Violence Initiative. A component of this initiative involves
entering into partnerships with local government agencies to "improve former clients'
ability to obtain employment." See Miami-Dade Public Defender's Office, Public
Defender AVI Primary Community Partnerships, at http://www.pdmiami.com/
partnerships.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2003).
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office or delivery system seek to promote quality to enable the
individual lawyer to perform as she should. To ensure quality in
representation, defenders will need first to determine what is
necessary to drive quality through an indigent defense delivery
system. To do this, defenders might decide to undertake defining an
indigent defense system's mission and, as a prerequisite, helping to
determine who should be involved in defining it. To do this,
defenders would need to consider what the essential conditions
necessary to fulfilling that mission are and how to measure whether
the steps taken are successful and whether systemic conditions
promote quality representation.
When the Executive Session participants examined the mission of
indigent defense service providers, they defined the mission as
twofold.2"6 They envisioned that a system would embrace and
promote holistic advocacy for individual clients. Additionally, they
identified a larger mission for the system of public defense that
involved ensuring that the voices of those against whom policies are
typically implemented have a place in the system of justice. In
performing this role, they saw the mission of the public defense
system as safeguarding against any efforts by the government to
sacrifice fairness at the altar of security. Defenders, in their judgment,
needed to assume a more public role in reminding government and
the public that our freedoms constitute our security.z
This greater function for the defender system melds a variety of
roles. First, the system assumes a public education role. This
envisions that defenders will leverage the media with consistent
messages about fairness. Defenders need to recognize and articulate
the myriad ways that the interests of the accused converge with those
of the general public. All the while, defenders must stress the
importance of the defense function by telling the story that the courts
and policy makers have barely mentioned. Second, the public defense
system should play a political role. Events that occur in the criminal
justice system are highly influenced and charged by politics. To
provide some measure of balance, defenders can no longer cede
control of the agenda to prosecutors, police and other political
leaders. They must take an active part in setting the criminal justice
agenda. This means anticipating policy trends, monitoring legislation
to correct missteps, and proposing alternatives that maintain a central
focus on fairness. Third, the public defense system should play a
critical role in the communities from which clients come and to which
206. See, e.g., Robin Steinberg & David Feige, Cultural Revolution: Transforming
the Public Defender's Office (August 2002), at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/criminal
justice/executive-sessions/espd.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Steinberg &
Feige, Cultural Revolution].
207. See generally Clarke & Stone, Bolder Management, supra note 124; "The Best
Defense Is No Offense," supra note 126.
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they will return. Defenders must seek out ways to work
collaboratively with the communities that too often lack a voice in
how the system of justice operates.
The prerequisites for fulfilling both the individual representation
mission and the larger public role coincide. Let's consider them one
at a time. First, the defense bar and defense delivery systems cannot
operate effectively without sufficient independence from the judicial
and executive branches. Defense lawyers must be free from
interference in the exercise of their representation. This does not
mean that defense systems should be allowed to operate without
oversight given fiscal accountability concerns. But it does mean that
restrictions on the role of counsel can interfere with a defender's
ability to provide zealous representation and can compromise quality.
Such restrictions can include judicial interference with or political
intrusion into the lawyer-client relationship. For example, if judges
feel political pressure to control costs, they may look to limit or refuse
to approve expenditures for expert services requested by the
defense. "" Additionally, electoral considerations can improperly
influence the judge's decision to appoint or reappoint a chief
defender.219 If a governor runs for election on a tough on crime
platform, she may feel compelled to appoint a chief defender who is
less than zealous in her efforts to defend the very people the governor
seeks to remove from society.21 ' Independence from such influence
enables the defender to have sufficient sense of mission and provides
safeguards that enable her to deliver effective assistance.
A second precondition for quality is that the system receive
adequate funding to handle both the number and complexity of cases
assigned to the defender or defender system. Underfunding of the
defense function has become so commonplace that its mere mention
borders on the obvious. 21 ' But the impact is clear. A lack of sufficient
resources strains the system in ways that may not always be apparent.
Inadequate funding forces the defender to make assessments about
the ways in which she will spend limited funds and may lead them to
cut corners in the conduct of the defense to stay within budgetary
constraints. Such choices will inevitably affect the quality of the
representation. A defender office operating under an inadequate
budget may be unable to fill staff vacancies or to hire sufficient
numbers of lawyers.
208. See, e.g., Catherine Greene Burnett et al., In Pursuit of Independent, Qualified,
and Effective Counsel: The Past and Future of Indigent Criminal Defense in Texas, 42
S. Tex. L. Rev. 595, 639 (2001).
209. 1t. at 646; Stephen B. Bright, Glimpses at a Dream Yet to Be Realized,
Champion, Mar. 1998, at 12, 65 [hereinafter Bright, Glimpses].
210. Bright, Glimpses, supra note 209, at 65.
211. See id., at 66; Klein & Spangenberg, supra note 104, at I (prepared for the
American Bar Association Section of Criminal Justice Ad Hoc Committee on
Indigent Defense Crisis).
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Third, caps on caseloads or standards thatgovern the number of
cases an individual can handle at a given time will directly affect the
nature and quality of the representation provided.212 If a defense
delivery system does not at once identify and impose limits on the
number of cases for which an individual lawyer will be responsible,
case pressures will inevitably overwhelm the lawyer and compromise
the representation. A lawyer working in a defender office crippled by
case overload candidly reported that prior to the increase in cases in
her office, she had conceived of her role as looking for the single issue
that would give her client a plausible argument to make in her
defense. With case overload, that same lawyer now looked for the
one issue that she could identify to convince her client to resolve the
case short of trial.213
Fourth, the appointment system must be governed by set standards
of assignment that focus on competence to perform the function of
defense counsel. Obviously, the appointing authority may have
competing concerns in administering an indigent defense system. For
example, there may be pressures to move cases efficiently and quickly.
But the speed with which a lawyer resolves a case should never form
the basis for appointment. Clearing a court's calendar may be an
important goal, but the choice of counsel should be a separate
objective.214  Similarly, an appointing authority should not be
permitted to pretend that a system that rewards the appointment of a
case to the lowest bidder will do anything other than guarantee
mediocrity or worse. Standards that focus on the lawyer's
qualifications to handle a case of a particular level of seriousness as
well as her ability to work well with clients should be factors that
assume the highest significance in the appointment process.215
A fifth condition is perhaps more controversial but nonetheless
vital. Quality cannot be achieved in representation in the criminal
justice system without a working familiarity with the concerns of the
communities in which defender offices operate and from which their
clients come. By maintaining an active presence in communities,
212. See Nat'l Legal Aid & Defender Ass'n, The Other Face of Justice 29 (1973);
Comment, Caseload Ceilings on Indigent Defense Systems to Ensure Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 43 U. Cin. L. Rev. 185 (1974) (recommending maximum
caseloads per year for individual public defenders).
213. Between 1988 and 1990, I served as a consultant examining indigent defense in
Georgia, Minnesota and Wisconsin. These comments were made in the course of an
interview of a staff lawyer.
214. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Elected Judges and the Death Penalty in Texas:
Why Full Habeas Corpus Review by Independent Federal Judges Is Indispensable to
Protecting Constitutional Rights, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1805, 1812 (2000) [hereinafter Bright,
Elected Judges] (noting the continual appointment of Joe Frank Cannon, who, by his
own account, sped through capital trials like "greased lightning").
215. See, e.g., NLADA Standards for the Administration of Assigned Counsel
Systems (1989), available at http://www.nlada.org/Defender/DefenderStandards/
StandardsForTheAdministration-Of-Assigned Counsel (last visited Feb. 6, 2003).
2003] 1509
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
defenders increase their ability to tap into residents' experiences with
the criminal justice system. This interaction can expose defenders to
reasons that members of subordinated communities may find law and
lawyers more dangerous than helpful. It offers firsthand knowledge of
the impact of criminal justice policies and how those policies may be
perceived by the individuals in whose names these actions are often
initiated. Having this information can help the defender remain alert
both to trends in criminal justice and to hot-button issues that may
ultimately affect her clients' rights and lives.
A final condition that will help to promote and guarantee quality is
comprehensive training. Too few defender offices and indigent
defense systems provide on-going training to prepare defenders for
the task of representing a client well.216 The Public Defender Service
for the District of Columbia ("PDS") has set the model that has
served its lawyers and clients for the past forty years.2"7 The program
conducts an initial six week in-house training regimen for entering
lawyers before they represent a single client.2" The training is
designed to help defenders think about the various facets of
representation and to engage in simulations that highlight aspects of
the representation to help identify best practices and correct missteps
before a client's liberty is at risk. PDS also sponsors the Criminal
Practice Institute ("CPI"), an annual training program for the entire
defense bar that includes social workers, investigators and other
professionals in the role of trainers."9 The CPI also produces a trial
manual to aid lawyers in practice.22 Such programs help to lift the
level of performance in representation.
But training should not confine its focus to the dynamics of
individual representation. If the indigent defense community intends
to embrace a larger role in the community, then the training regimen
needs to help individual defenders understand the dynamics of
collaborative work in the broader community.22" ' In many ways, the
training for community collaborations might feel unfamiliar and
almost counterintuitive to the individual lawyer. Representing
individuals in the course of a criminal proceeding places the lawyer in
a position of significant control over the way the case will proceed.
216. See generally Charles J. Ogletree, An Essay on the New Public Defender for
the 21st Century, 58 Law & Contemp. Probs. 81 (Winter 1995).
217. See Public Defender - D.C., supra note 205.
218. See Ogletree, Beyond Justifications, supra note 120, at 1286.
219. See The Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia, The Criminal
Practice Institute (CPI), at http://www.pdsdc.org/cpi/index.asp (last visited Feb. 21,
2003).
220. Id.
221. See Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 321 (2002) [hereinafter Thompson, It Takes a Community] (discussing
the need for training for prosecutors interested in pursuing community prosecution
objectives).
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This is not meant to suggest that the lawyer dictates the course of
action or does not work closely with her client. But in the hearings as
well as in trial, the lawyer has considerable flexibility in mounting the
defense and determining how to present the client's case. In
collaborative work that may involve a number of individuals and
entities, the degree of control a single individual can wield-or, more
importantly, maintain-may be much less than that which the
individual lawyer has come to expect.
Training for collaborative work involves helping to prepare lawyers
to subordinate their views to competing interests in attaining the
desired outcome. Helping lawyers to discern when they can
reasonably yield and when they must remain firm will be an important
part of training. In addition, training should underscore the value of
assuming a facilitative as opposed to a central role. Above all, lawyers
will need to learn ways to become involved in a community so that
they can begin to understand in some depth the degree to which the
lives of their clients and the concerns of the larger community
intersect and overlap. 222
Establishing a mission and identifying the necessary conditions for
quality offer an important start, but without identifying how that
quality can be measured, the defender community will ultimately
engage in a process that may offer more flash than substance. The
indigent defense community may wish to consider benchmarks and
standards as a means of establishing the level of quality the defense
should attempt to achieve. It may then choose to identify the process
by which defense lawyers' performance should be reviewed. One
option may be to utilize survey instruments coupled with some form
of peer review.
One target of such a survey should be the clients whom defense
counsel serve. Defenders often discuss client surveys as a potentially
fruitful source of information about the lawyer-client relationship.223
Unfortunately, defender offices rarely conduct them. A host of
reasons may explain this phenomenon. Principal among them may be
that defenders may lack the technical expertise involved in developing
survey instruments or in determining how to contact clients to gather
such information. Groups that rely on survey tools note that
gathering information requires considerable follow-up. 224 Such efforts
may make comprehensive surveys virtually impossible given the
demands on defenders' time. But defenders could consider
developing partnerships with graduate schools or law schools such
that students might undertake the implementation of the study.
222. Kim Taylor-Thompson, The Politics of Common Ground, 111 Harv. L. Rev.
1306 (1998); see also Regina Austin, "The Black Community," Its Lawbreakers, and a
Politics of Identification, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1769 (1992).




Should a surveying procedure prove to be unreasonable, less
ambitious efforts to solicit the views of focus groups of clients may still
be possible.225 Ultimately, clients offer a critical perspective because
they are the recipients of the representation and their perspectives
should contribute to any definition of quality.
Some defense lawyers have raised the concern that surveying clients
who are now incarcerated will necessarily result in a bad review of the
lawyer's performance.226  Obviously, the outcome of the case,
particularly if it involves a lengthy sentence, has the potential of
skewing clients' assessment of the lawyer's conduct. Defense lawyers
may need to factor in this possibility as part of the survey tool.
However, anecdotal information suggests that even when the outcome
of a case involves a prison term, clients can say-and do indicate-
that their lawyer performed well and provided quality service.227
Particularly in cases where the lawyer has treated the client with
respect and worked hard for the client, clients note that the working
relationship measured up to their expectations. Indeed, clients are
often quite savvy about what their chances were and appreciate the
effort expended on their behalf. Ignoring vital information, such as a
client's perception, is a mistake for a defender.
Given a broader collaborative role for defense counsel, defenders
may want to devise an instrument to seek and gather feedback from
community residents. This feedback can occur through the use of a
survey tool or through regular meetings with residents, possibly
through an advisory board to solicit the community's perceptions of
the work of the defenders and the defender office. 22' The sort of
information that defenders might attempt to gather from community
residents might include the community's views on the extent to which
it considers the defender office part of the dialogue on crime and as
contributing to the effort to maintain fairness in the system.
Defenders may anticipate receiving information from the community
suggesting that they not perform their role effectively, but recent
group polling conducted by the National Legal Aid and Defender
225. Id.
226. In my capacity as consultant to the Defender Division of the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts, I spoke with both federal and state defenders from across
the country who expressed this concern.
227. From 1981 to 1991, i worked as a public defender with the District of
Columbia's Public Defender Service. As I assumed supervisory positions, I was in the
position to learn of and evaluate any complaints, including those lodged against
lawyers. During that time, it was not unusual to hear laudatory comments from
clients about their lawyers, even when they were serving long sentences, and
complaints tended not to relate to sentences received.
228. See Thompson, It Takes a Community, supra note 221, at 368 (discussing the
use of community advisory boards to give feedback to a prosecutor's office);
Neighborhood Defender Service, Program Plan for the Neighborhood Defender
Service (May 2, 1990) (on file with Fordham Law Review).
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Association ("NLADA") does not support this assumption. 29 Their
polling data reveals that the public generally believes in an
individual's right to have effective representation.23 °
Defenders might also survey other members of the bar to solicit
impressions of their work. An open dialogue between the indigent
defense bar and the larger local or state bar has often led to
collaborative efforts that have improved the system of defense.231 A
past president of the ABA noted the connection between quality and
efforts by the bar. He noted,
In the absence of a concerted effort by the bar and other interested
groups, the quality of indigent defense will continue to
deteriorate.... State and local bar associations also have a
responsibility to act when, due to lack of adequate and balanced
funding, the constitutional rights of indigent persons accused of
crimes are consistently violated. I encourage state and local bars to
support increased funding for indigent defense, and to educate
legislators that their policies have consequences for the entire justice
system.232
The mutual flow of information about practices and limitations may
help to raise the consciousness of the bar and ultimately the public
about that which should be provided to defense systems to permit
them to achieve a level of quality.
Additional questions surface about whether the views of other
criminal justice players should be surveyed. Judges, prosecutors,
court personnel, probation officers all see aspects of the lawyer's
performance and can offer an assessment. The input from these
sources, however, may be biased given their competing concerns. For
example, judges interested in moving a calendar may see a lawyer's
adversarial posture as problematic because she contests every issue on
behalf of her clients. Obviously, such an assessment would need to be
judged based on what the defense community considers to be the
229. Belden Russonello & Stewart, NLADA, Americans Consider Indigent
Defense: Analysis of a National Study of Public Opinion (2002) (on file with the
Fordham Law Review), http://www.nlada.org/Defender/DefenderAwareness/
Defender Awareness-Indigent (last visited Feb. 21, 2003).
230. See "The Best Defense Is No Offense", supra note 126, at 2 n.4. For example,
the polling data revealed that a majority of respondents believed that low-income
people accused of crime should be guaranteed by the government (1) resources for
DNA testing (68%); (2) a lawyer with a small caseload (57%); (3) resources to hire
investigators (55%). See Belden Russonello & Stewart, supra note 229, at 3.
231. In 1988, I participated as a consultant examining the Fulton County Public
Defender office in Atlanta, Georgia. The office was crippled due to case overload
and underfunding. The evaluation team recommended the use of coalitions involving
the bar or Blue Ribbon Task Forces as a way to bring greater attention to the needs
of the indigent defense community. See generally Peter Appelbome, Study Faults
Atlanta's System of Defending Poor, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1990, at B5.




appropriate role of the defense lawyer. Similarly, probation officers
might complain that defense lawyers spend too much time contacting
them and trying to color their view of the client. Such critiques may in
fact indicate that the defender is performing her role as she should.
But a carefully structured survey instrument could seek information
from these actors that could provide valuable information.
Assessments of the lawyer's preparation, clarity of presentation,
timeliness and knowledge of the law may be tremendously helpful.
Any evaluation of whether the lawyer has succeeded in providing
quality in her representation of clients would seem to require input
from peers. The health care profession has utilized peer review as a
key part of its effort to maintain quality in the care that physicians
provide.233 Crucial components of a peer review system appear to be
that the charge of such systems would not be to monitor ethical
violations as bar counsel might. Rather, the focus of such a review
would need to steer clear of ethical questions and focus solely on
improving the quality of practice.
With that goal in mind, confidentiality would seem an essential
prerequisite.234 Candor between the lawyer being reviewed and the
reviewers would go a long way toward the goal of understanding what
may have happened in the course of representation as well as
ultimately lifting the level of practice. But the sole reason for
developing a peer review system would be to provide a vehicle for
conversation among peers about practices that might fall below a
quality threshold and that might, therefore, be changed. There are
obvious drawbacks in any effort to set standards, canvass the views of
others, and impose the burden on defense lawyers to meet the
requirements that might be set. Defense lawyers may already feel
that they are under sufficient pressure from courts, clients and the bar
to maintain effective assistance. They may also worry that if the
information is examined by peers or, as a result of surveys, is not kept
confidential that it could be used by a variety of parties against the
lawyer. The disciplinary arm of the bar or clients might be prompted
to raise claims against the lawyer because of information learned
through a mechanism that was originally designed as a practice aid.235
Moreover, the peer review process might raise concern if the
guidelines under which it operated permitted too much latitude in
determining what constitutes quality. For example, a review panel
233. See Christopher S. Morter, Note, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of
1986: Will Physicians Find Peer Review More Inviting?, 74 Va. L. Rev. 1115 (1988)
(discussing the historical development of peer review in the medical profession);
Katherine T. Stukes, Note, The Medical Peer Review Privilege After Virmani, 80 N.C.
L. Rev. 1860, 1862-64 (2002) [hereinafter Stukes, Medical Peer Review] (describing
how peer review operates within the medical profession).
234. See Stukes, Medical Peer Review, supra note 233, at 1862-63 (discussing the
importance of confidentiality in making peer review work).
235. Id. (discussing this problem in the context of the medical profession).
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could conceivably choose to impose a certain style of lawyering on the
defense lawyers it reviews or to mandate a uniformity of practice. But
careful guidelines about what the lawyer should provide could avoid
the potential to single out a lawyer who happened to diverge from the
norm, but also provided aggressive and effective representation
through the use of unfamiliar or unorthodox methods.
3. Appealing to a Broader Audience
Identifying the components of quality by establishing benchmarks is
in part an internal conversation for the defense community. Indigent
defense service providers must decide for themselves how to conceive
of quality and how to provide it. But the quality message necessarily
includes an external component. The public must come to appreciate
the value of quality in criminal defense so that it can resist the impulse
to narrow the right. Because defenders often feel reluctant to take
public positions, particularly in the midst of controversy, they may
question the wisdom of participating in the larger public dialogue
about quality defense.236 A high profile can open defenders to attack.
Still, taking themselves out of the conversation may exact too great a
price, sacrificing any meaningful right to counsel.
In fashioning the public message to deliver in this context,
defenders should seek common ground between their clients and the
public. Rather than permitting the narrative that the lawyer
representing an accused stands in opposition to the public or the
public's safety to survive, defense lawyers will need to craft a message
that binds groups rather than highlights differences. Defenders
should tap shared values as they appeal to the public, noting that
defense counsel protects all individuals, including the innocent,
against the unrestrained power of the state. Indeed, defenders may
need to take the message further, warning the public that the loss of
effective representation of the individual accused could begin to
unravel the democratic fabric.
This is not just hyperbole. Once any government discovers that it
can withdraw individual rights without consequence, it is but a small
step to future incursions. Depriving an individual of effective
representation when her life or liberty hangs in the balance is a frontal
assault on the democratic freedoms that the society cherishes. But
such an enormous assault is often a mere prelude to suspending rights
to speech and other liberties. Arguments that the crisis environment
justifies the suspension of fundamental liberties offer immediate but
false comfort to a public fearing for its safety. Indeed, the pattern is
all too familiar. A government engages in overzealous prosecutions of
236. See Lisa J. McIntyre, The Public Defender (1987) (noting in a study of the
Cook County Public Defender Office that defenders tended to embrace a degree of
invisibility so as to position themselves below the political radar screen).
2003] 1515
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
those individuals and groups in the unenviable position of being the
least powerful and most distrusted. Once the public tolerates
disposing of rights for some, the rights of the rest are in peril.
Given the stakes, quality in representation is nothing less than
imperative. The accused requires effective protection in her
individual fight for life or liberty. Anything less threatens democracy.
Quality must also be assured at the level of the criminal justice system.
Preventing individual encroachments of rights helps to stem a tide
leading to the dissolution of rights for everyone. When counsel
operates as the check on overzealous prosecution as it should, then
the average citizen can feel more secure.
How can the defense community convey this message to the public?
It can begin by participating in the larger dialogue about crime. This
means developing a relationship with the media such that indigent
defense service providers are among the array of players who typically
opine about issues of crime and justice. They must not only respond
to any attacks on the right to counsel, but should also affirmatively
work to shape the conversation and perceptions about the significance
of quality in making representation effective. In wresting the
definition of quality in representation away from others with
competing interests, the defense community can make clear its
message that quality is important. The public dialogue, in turn, will
help to set public expectations about what they should receive and will
help to educate the larger community about the dangers of providing
less than that to which they are entitled.
CONCLUSION
As the nation grapples with new threats to its security, there may be
considerable pressure to constrict fundamental rights like the right to
counsel as a temporary measure during a particular crisis. But too
often, irreparable damage can occur in the course of the temporary
fix. As importantly, once a government has determined that certain
rights can be suspended, it is often quite difficult to return to a
landscape that refuses to tolerate any suspensions of rights. Unless
the defense community takes this opportunity to define what it does
and to insist that nothing less than quality in representation will
suffice, then much of the right to counsel could effectively evaporate
with little notice or noise.
The Supreme Court charted a path to Gideon that trumpeted the
importance of counsel effectively representing the individual.
Although the states' experience with the appointment of counsel since
Gideon has muted what the Court seemed to intend in its Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence, the defense community has an obligation
to raise its own performance and standards to fulfill the original
mandate.
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